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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the eﬀects of fiscal policy on dif-
ferent aspects of the economy. These papers share and empirical nature and
exploit both macro and microdata to provide an answer to questions related
to the eﬀect of government spending and taxation in the postwar US.
The second chapter analyses the impact of government spending shocks
on economic activity during periods of high and low uncertainty and during
periods of boom and recession. I identify exogenous government spending
shocks using both a structural vector autoregression with exclusion restrictions
and narrative methods based on news about future defence spending. I find
that government spending shocks have larger impacts on output in booms than
in recessions and larger impacts during tranquil times than during uncertain
times.
The third chapter investigates how taxes aﬀect relative mobility in the
income distribution in the US. I employ household panel data drawn from the
PSID between 1967 and 1996 to analyse the relationship between marginal
tax rates and the probability of staying in the same income decile. I identify
exogenous variation in marginal tax rates by using counterfactual rates based
on legislated changes in the tax schedule. I find that higher marginal tax rates
reduce income mobility.
The fourth chapter explores the recent trends in intergenerational mobility
in the US and how fiscal policy has aﬀected them. I consider the relationship
between the level of income of fathers and sons using household data from the
PSID. I then investigate how changes in taxation resulting from recent fiscal
reforms may have aﬀected such relationship. I find evidence that suggest that
sons whose fathers have benefited from fiscal reforms that reduced taxes, are
less likely to inherit the income status of their fathers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Do government purchases stimulate the economy? How individuals change
their behaviour when facing changes in their tax liabilities? Questions related
to fiscal policy have always been central in the study of economics.1 The impor-
tance of this type of policies has increased in the recent years, when monetary
policy (the other pillar of government action) has remained constrained.
This dissertation consists of three essays on the eﬀects of fiscal policy on dif-
ferent aspects of the economy. These chapters share and empirical nature and
exploit both macro and microdata to provide an answer to questions related
to the eﬀect of government spending and taxation in the postwar US.
In the second chapter, titled Is Fiscal Policy More Eﬀective in Uncertain
Times or During Recessions?, I analyse how uncertainty and the state of the
business cycle aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of government spending. There are rea-
sons to believe that the eﬀects of fiscal policy may diﬀer when the economy
faces a heightened level of uncertainty or slack (e.g. the presence of adjustment
costs suggests that firms will be more cautious and therefore less responsive to
stimuli). I attempt to shed light on this question by empirically characterising
1See Ramey (2011b) and Keane (2011) for recent surveys on the eﬀects of government
spending and taxation.
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the response of output and other macroeconomic aggregates to an exogenous
shock in government spending that occurs during these states.
I consider the US economy to face a heightened period of uncertainty when
the stock market volatility is unusually high. To define periods of recessions,
I follow the NBER’s dates of business cycles. In order to identify exogenous
movements in government spending, I use two of the most used approaches
in the literature. The first one is a structural vector autoregression that im-
poses an exclusion restriction on the contemporaneous response of government
spending (justified by the time lag in the response of the fiscal authorities to
economic developments). The second method identifies government spending
shocks directly by using narrative methods, which consist in quantifying the
changes in government defence spending at the moment of their announcement
looking at newspapers and other periodicals (see Ramey (2011a)). The results
are remarkably similar in both identification strategies and suggest that an
exogenous increase in government spending during times of high uncertainty
or recession may have contractionary eﬀects on output (while being expan-
sionary during times of booms or low uncertainty). This evidence, which has
important policy implications, contrasts with other works that find govern-
ment spending to be more eﬀective in stimulating the economy during periods
of recessions. I reconcile both views and conclude that these diﬀerences arise
from the information used to define periods of recessions.
The third chapter, entitled The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility, rep-
resented my job market paper in 2016. I analyse the eﬀect of tax reforms on
the relative movements of households along the distribution of income in the
US. The design of the tax schedule has important implications for income in-
equality, but it may also aﬀect the decisions of households to take advantage of
economic opportunities. Following a standard labour supply model, a house-
16
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hold experiencing a positive wage shock in a given period may find it optimal
to increase its labour supply. This could result in an increase in the relative
position in the distribution of income with respect to households that did not
experience the same shock. However, high tax progression reduces the house-
holds’ incentives to take advantage of these opportunities, what would result
in fewer movements in the income distribution. To investigate the relationship
between taxes and income mobility, I use household panel data from the PSID
and construct the marginal tax rate that a married couple faces according to
their income, their demographic characteristics and the design of the federal
tax schedule of that year.
I estimate the impact of changes in the marginal tax rate on the probabil-
ity that households stay in the same quantile of the distribution. To address
endogeneity issues, I identify exogenous variation in the marginal tax rates by
looking at the several legislated tax changes that occurred in the US at the
federal level during 1967 and 1996. I find that taxes have a negative and sig-
nificant eﬀect on income mobility: a percentage point increase in the marginal
tax rate reduces the probability that a household changes to a diﬀerent income
decile by almost 1% (which implies that a seven percentage point reduction
in the tax rate can explain a tenth of the yearly average movements in the
income distribution). This eﬀect, which is found to be robust along several di-
mensions, has important implications for policies that aim to reduce economic
disparities, since tax reforms targeting income inequality are likely to aﬀect
income mobility as well. In future research, I intend to study this question fur-
ther by analysing the dynamics and joint welfare implications of both income
inequality and mobility in the framework of a dynamic general equilibrium
with ex-post heterogeneity. A model in the spirit of Bewley-Hugget-Aiyagari
coupled with labour supply decisions and investment in human capital is able
17
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to general income and wealth inequality, because households experience diﬀer-
ence wage or productivity shocks that lead them to adjust their labour supply
and accumulate their gains or invest them to obtain higher income income
the future. This is an adequate framework to understand the welfare eﬀects of
changes in income inequality and mobility produced by reforms of a progressive
tax schedule.
The fourth chapter, Do Tax Changes Aﬀect Intergenerational Mobility?
explores how fiscal policy may have contributed to the transmission of income
status from parents to children. In the recent years, the distribution of income
and the equality of opportunity are topics that have attracted much attention
from policy makers (Krueger (2012)). But does fiscal policy increase the de-
gree of social mobility? In this chapter I consider the relationship between
the level of income of fathers and sons using household data from the PSID.
I then construct a measure of changes in tax liabilities arising from legislated
changes in the tax code for each household. With these ingredients I investi-
gate how changes in taxation aﬀect the degree of intergenerational mobility.
I find evidence that suggests that sons whose fathers have benefited from fis-
cal reforms that reduced taxes, are less likely to inherit the income status of
their fathers. Particularly I find that the diﬀerence in the elasticity between a
family that faces a 1,000-dollar change and a family who does not is around 5
percentage points. A potential mechanism that may bring about these results
is one based on the decision of parents to invest in the stock of human capital
of their children. Reforms that reduce the tax liabilities that parents face,
enable them to use these extra resources in funding education and providing
their children with better opportunities, what would translate in higher inter-
generational mobility. These results suggest that, through income taxation,
fiscal policy can impact on the equality of opportunity between generations.
18
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This is an important dimension that policy actions should take into account
when considering their medium run eﬀects.
19

Chapter 2
Is Fiscal Policy More Eﬀective
in Uncertain Times or During
Recessions?
2.1 Introduction
How do uncertainty and the state of the business cycle aﬀect the eﬀectiveness
of fiscal policy? Economic models incorporating non-convex adjustment costs,
as in Bloom et al. (2012), suggest that high levels of uncertainty make agents
more cautious when taking investment/hiring decisions, thereby reducing the
eﬀect of fiscal policy.1 Michaillat (2014) argues that slackness in the economy
will improve the eﬀectiveness of some fiscal policies.2 In this chapter I attempt
1Bloom et al. (2012) develop a model in which uncertainty is time-varying and aﬀects the
volatility of technology shocks, and firms are heterogeneous and face non-convex adjustment
costs in capital and labour. Fiscal policy is modelled as a wage subsidy. The eﬀect of such
a policy is smaller when the policy is implemented at the time uncertainty first hits the
economy but slightly larger when the policy is conducted one year later.
2Michaillat (2014) considers a New Keynesian model with a search and matching friction
where an increase in the size of the public workforce during periods of slack (unemployment
increases from 5 to 8%) doubles its eﬀect (as measured by the additional number of workers
employed when one more worker is employed in the public sector) compared to that under
non-recessionary conditions.
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to shed light on this question by empirically characterising how uncertainty and
the state of the business cycle influence the eﬀects of government spending.
My empirical strategy is based on a nonlinear structural vector autoregres-
sion (SVAR) that allows for diﬀering eﬀects of government spending shocks
during times of high (HU) and low (LU) uncertainty, or during times of reces-
sion (R) and boom (B). Following Bloom (2009), I identify periods of HU as
those with unusually high stock market volatility. I define periods of R and
B following the NBER’s recording of the dates of business cycles. Exogenous
shocks to government spending are identified using two alternative strategies.
In the first case, the shocks are identified as the residuals in a SVAR that im-
poses the exclusion restriction that government spending cannot react within
one quarter to shocks to output and tax revenues, as pioneered by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In the second case, I follow a narrative approach and iden-
tify government spending shocks using the news about future defence spending
produced by Ramey (2011a). The narratively identified shocks are then classi-
fied according to whether they occur during times of HU or LU or, alternatively,
during times of R or B. This second framework allows us to address issues as
anticipation eﬀects of the shocks, and oﬀers an alternative assessment of the
exogeneity of the shocks. I apply this methodology to US data between 1948
Q1 and 2007 Q4.
The results suggest that the response of output to a positive government
shock is negative during times of HU or R and positive during times of LU or
B. Interestingly, the two identification strategies achieve very similar results.
These results can be understood in the light of a framework where information
is scarce or noisy during times of HU. In this context, agents are concerned that
the economy may take a downturn and reduce their future levels of income.
A government spending shock during times of heightened uncertainty may
22
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then simply confirm these pessimistic views, in turn producing a decline in
consumption and activity. I find evidence of measures of household-sector
confidence reacting negatively to a government spending shock during times
of HU, together with consumption and prices.
The results I obtain contrast with previous literature that finds government
spending shocks to be more eﬀective in stimulating the economy during periods
of R than B (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)). I reconcile the two views
and conclude that these diﬀerences arise from the information used to define
periods of R.
By using the VAR framework to obtain impulse response functions, we
are imposing the restriction that responses are fixed for each regime (history-
independence). I check whether this is an issue using the local projections of
Jorda` (2005), as suggested in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Ramey
and Zubairy (2014).
Traditional empirical research on fiscal policy, starting with the influential
work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and subsequent papers such as Ramey
(2011a) and Barro and Redlick (2011),3 has focused on the linear eﬀects of fiscal
policy (i.e. the eﬀect of the fiscal policy is assumed to be the same regardless
of potentially changing conditions). The conclusion of the above research is
that government spending stimulates economic activity, although the precise
impact, as measured by the so-called fiscal multiplier, is still controversial
(Hall (2010)).4 Another strand of the literature suggests the opposite eﬀect:
government spending cuts have expansionary eﬀects under certain conditions.
This is the implication of work by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina
3Other works on the economic eﬀects of government spending include, for example,
Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Burnside et al. (2004), Perotti (2004) and Mountford and Uhlig
(2009).
4The government spending multiplier is defined as the ratio of output change to an
exogenous discretionary increase in government spending. See Ramey (2011b) for a survey
on the fiscal multiplier.
23
Chapter 2. Is Fiscal Policy More Eﬀective in Uncertain Times or During
Recessions?
and Ardagna (2013).5
There is, however, a recent emphasis on allowing for nonlinear eﬀects of
fiscal policy, as highlighted in Parker (2011). Corsetti et al. (2013) suggest
that the health of public finances might not only aﬀect the magnitude but also
the sign of the response of output to government spending. In recessions in an
economy with a high level of debt and where monetary policy is constrained
(e.g. because of the zero lower bound), an increase in government spending may
increase the probability of default, lowering demand. Under certain conditions,
the multiplier can shift from positive to zero, or even become negative and
large.6
Bertola and Drazen (1993) and Bi et al. (2013) argue that expectations
about future government spending can also generate nonlinear eﬀects. These
authors explore the idea that cuts in government spending can cause an eco-
nomic expansion if they induce agents to believe that government spending
will be higher in the future. Bi et al. (2013) build on this idea and suggest
that changes in agents’ expectations about fiscal policy (the timing of it and
instruments used) can generate positive or negative eﬀects on economic activ-
ity, depending on other elements of the economy such as the monetary policy
stance or the level of government debt.
A growing body of evidence (Bloom (2009), Baker et al. (2013)) suggests
that uncertainty does have a negative eﬀect on economic activity. However,
no research so far provides empirical evidence on how uncertainty aﬀects fiscal
5See Alesina (2010) for a review of the expansionary eﬀects of fiscal consolidations.
6An increasing number of studies are also investigating whether the government spend-
ing multiplier can be higher during times when the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates binds. Christiano et al. (2011) argue that large shocks to preferences regarding in-
tertemporal substitution can lead to liquidity traps. In such cases, government spending,
by causing inflation, will stimulate output by a much bigger magnitude than during normal
times (impact multiplier of 1.6; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2012) find an impact multiplier
of 3 in a nonlinear setting). However, Mertens and Ravn (2014) argue that this eﬀect could
be the opposite if we consider that the liquidity trap is caused by an exogenous (sunspot)
shock to confidence that drives a shift from optimism to pessimism.
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policy.7 This question could have important implications from a policy-making
standpoint, regarding the extent to which a fiscal intervention may be appro-
priate during a period of turmoil.
My work does relate to an increasing amount of empirical studies focus-
ing on whether business cycle conditions are associated with nonlinear eﬀects
of fiscal policy, for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2013), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Mittnik and Semmler
(2012), Fazzari et al. (2012), Bognanni (2012), Owyang et al. (2013), Ramey
and Zubairy (2014) and Caggiano et al. (2015).8 However, the variety of
methodologies employed and the heterogeneity in the definitions of what can
be considered a recession (or a slack economy) yield very diﬀerent results.
Some of these studies find that recessions or periods of slack in the economy
make government spending a particularly powerful tool. This is true of Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012), one of the most prominent studies in this
body of literature. These authors use a smooth-transition SVAR in which the
probability of recession is weighted by a seven-period centred moving average
of the growth rate of output, their measure of the state of the business cy-
cle. Bognanni (2012) finds the opposite: a smaller multiplier during recessions
in a Markov-switching VAR in which the probability of recession is estimated
period by period. Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014), mean-
while, find no impact of the state of the business cycle on government spending
multipliers.
The present analysis diﬀers from the studies just cited in two important
dimensions. First, I use a simple and transparent methodology that allows
7Aastveit et al. (2013) investigate the eﬀects of uncertainty on the eﬀectiveness of mon-
etary policy.
8Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2013) explore the eﬀect of fiscal policy during times of financial
crisis. The authors find that firms’ financial distress (as measured by a reduction in their
net worth because of lower commercial land prices) implies a significantly lower government
spending multiplier.
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estimation by OLS and the implementation of diﬀerent identification strategies
for government spending shocks. Second, instead of estimating the probability
of recession, or using other variables as ways to estimate the output gap, I
employ the definition the NBER uses to measure recession.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
empirical strategy and presents the results obtained from the diﬀerent methods
employed to identify the government spending shocks. Since the findings of
this chapter are in striking contrast to previous conclusions in the literature,
I investigate the sources of these diﬀerences. Section 4.5 contains diﬀerent
robustness tests for the results of the benchmark specifications. Section 3.7
concludes and oﬀers directions for future research.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
The empirical literature on the eﬀects of fiscal policy disagrees on which is the
best way to identify government spending shocks. The two most commonly
used frameworks diﬀer in their assumptions and in the results obtained (see
Hall (2010)).9 The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) methodology makes use of an
SVAR and identifies exogenous government spending shocks as the only ones
that can aﬀect government spending contemporaneously. The second method
identifies government spending shocks following Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
who use unexpected changes in defence spending. While recognising that both
frameworks have their merits, here I do not take a stance on the suitability of
each one but instead use both. They will be described in more detail below.
To define periods of HU I follow the methodology and data described in
Bloom (2009). Bloom (2009) constructs a monthly measure of uncertainty
9An alternative method would be to restrict the sign of some responses of the system to
achieve identification, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
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Figure 2.1: Periods of HU and R between 1948 Q1 and 2007 Q4
using the VXO index of implied volatility from 1986 onwards and using the
actual monthly return volatilities of the SP500 index between 1962 and 1986.10
I extend these estimates back to 1948. Major uncertainty events are selected as
those months which have a stock market volatility of 1.65 standard deviations
above a Hodrick-Prescott trend (with a smoothing coeﬃcient of 129,600). Since
the sample has a quarterly frequency, I consider periods of HU to be those
quarters containing any of the monthly events described above.11 Periods of
LU are defined as the rest of the quarters.
The definition of quarters of R or B is done by following the business cycle
dates produced by the NBER. Figure 2.1 shows the quarters of HU (32 in
total) and those of R (35).12
For both specifications the data used contains real federal government
spending, output and tax revenues in per capita terms as described in the
Appendix. The sample starts in 1948q1 and finishes in 2007q4.
10The adequacy of stock market volatility as a measure of uncertainty is also documented
in Bloom et al. (2007).
11The results are very similar when I consider quarterly volatility (instead of monthly)
and pick up the periods with unusually high values.
12See Bloom (2009) for a complete characterisation and description of the HU events
since 1962.
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2.2.1 The SVAR Approach
To capture the potentially diﬀerent contemporaneous and dynamic responses of
the variables to government spending shocks, I estimate an otherwise standard
SVAR with dummy variables that provide information about the change in
economic conditions (from times of LU to HU or between R and B):
xt = BL(L)xt−1 + (BH(L)−BL(L))Htxt−1 + et (2.1)
et =Dtεt (2.2)
Dt = (DL +DHHt) (2.3)
where xt = [gt, yt, trt]′ and et ∼ N (0,DtD′t) is a vector of residuals which are
linear combinations of the structural shocks εt ∼ N (0, I). B(L) = (I−B1L−
B2L2 . . .BpLp) represents a lag polynomial of order p.13
Ht is a dummy variable that takes a value of one during periods of HU (or
R, depending on the analysis).14 When Ht = 0, the dynamic lagged variables
aﬀect the system through BL(L), and when Ht = 1 through BH(L), allowing
for a potentially diﬀerent dynamic response in the system. The contemporane-
ous response matrix Dt is also allowed to be state-dependent, changing during
periods of LU or B (matrix DL) and periods of HU or R (matrix DH). The
specification also includes a state-varying constant and a quadratic trend (as
emphasised in Francis and Ramey (2009)).
In the framework of this subsection, exogenous shocks to government spend-
ing are identified using an exclusion restriction: government spending does not
react contemporaneously to other structural shocks. This assumption implies
13I set p = 4 following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ramey (2011a).
14Some studies (see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)) advocate using Ht−1 instead
of Ht to avoid contemporaneous feedback from fiscal policies into the state of the economy.
The results are similar regardless of which specification I use.
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that there is a time lag of one quarter required to enact public spending bills.
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the plausibility of this restriction rests
on the minimum required time that the fiscal authority faces when adjusting
government spending to surprise changes in fiscal (as measured by shocks to
tax revenues ) or general (as measured by shocks to output) macroeconomic
conditions. To implement this restriction, the matrix Dt is obtained from a
Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the relevant resid-
uals from equation 2.1, where government spending is ordered first.
To prevent the nonlinearities that are present in equation 2.1 from altering
the original Blanchard-Perotti identification assumption, I impose 0 coeﬃcients
on the matrix B1(L) = BH(L)−BL(L) for the government equation. There-
fore, government spending shocks εgt are identified, in line with Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), from:
gt =
p∑
j=1
βg0,jxt−j + ε
g
t
When we do not allow for diﬀerential responses due to changing economic
distinctions, i.e. Ht = 0 for all periods, equation 2.1 reduces to a standard
linear SVAR model:
xt = B(L)xt−1 +Dεt (2.4)
I start by estimating equation 2.4 to establish a comparison with previous
work. Figure 2.2 shows the responses of the variables in the system to a
positive shock in government spending that raises government spending by
1% at its peak. The figure also shows 68% and 95% confidence intervals,
computed using a non-parametric bootstrap method.15 The response of output
15To compute the confidence intervals, I generate 100,000 bootstrap draws of the endoge-
nous variables using the estimated coeﬃcients (BˆH(L) and BˆL(L)) and residuals (eˆt) from
equation 2.1. I re-estimate the VAR using the bootstrap samples and compute the 68th and
95th percentiles of the resulting impulse responses.
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Figure 2.2: Responses in the linear model (SVAR identification)
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Responses to a government spending shock (identified with exclusion restrictions) in a linear
model. 68% and 95% confidence bands computed with a non-parametric bootstrap.
is positive throughout the horizon (20 quarters). The implied elasticity of the
GDP on impact with respect to the government spending peak is 0.045. When
translated into multiplier terms, the impact multiplier is 0.46, increasing to
0.85 at the peak.16 The results are qualitatively similar (although slightly
smaller in size) to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), with output reaching its peak
impact after the fourth year).
I now relax the implied assumption that changes in government spending
always have the same eﬀect. When allowing for nonlinearities as described in
equation 2.1, the results change dramatically. I start with the case where Ht
takes a value of 1 during periods of HU as described above. Figure 2.3 shows
the responses to a positive shock to government spending. The first panel (in
blue) shows the responses of the variables in the system during times of LU.
The response of output is slightly higher than in Figure 2.2 (0.56 on impact,
implying an impact multiplier of almost 0.6, and about 1 at the peak) and
remains significant throughout the 20 quarters considered. The responses of
government spending and tax revenues are qualitatively similar to the linear
case. The bottom panel (in red) of Figure 2.3 shows the response to the same
16The ratio of nominal GDP to nominal federal government spending in the sample is
10.13.
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Figure 2.3: Responses during times of LU and HU (SVAR identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified with
exclusion restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows re-
sponses during times of high uncertainty. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed
using a non-parametric bootstrap.
shock during times of HU. In striking contrast with the previous case, a positive
government spending shock is associated with a large, significant and negative
response of output. The eﬀect of the shock is small on impact but it builds up
progressively until after the second year, with an elasticity of −0.48 (which in
this sample would imply a peak multiplier of -4.9). The response of government
spending during times of HU has a similar shape to the linear case during the
first three years, although it exhibits more persistent eﬀects from the shock.
Next, I consider the case of nonlinearities caused by the state of the business
cycle (Ht takes a value of 1 during periods of R). The responses are shown
in Figure 2.4. During times of B, the response of output is positive and very
similar to the linear case during the first three quarters, although the shock now
has very temporal eﬀects and output becomes slightly negative but insignificant
31
Chapter 2. Is Fiscal Policy More Eﬀective in Uncertain Times or During
Recessions?
Figure 2.4: Responses during times of B and R (SVAR identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified with
exclusion restrictions) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses
during times of recession. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using a non-
parametric bootstrap.
during the rest of the horizon.17 During times of R, the response of output to
a positive increase in government spending is instead estimated to be negative.
The magnitude of this eﬀect is, however, smaller than in the case of the HU
periods considered earlier (the elasticity at the peak is -0.1).
These results suggest that the response of output to government spending
shocks does not remain the same across all states of the economy. In particular,
it becomes negative when we consider periods of HU or R.
2.2.2 The Narrative Approach
In this subsection, I use a diﬀerent framework to achieve identification of the
government spending shocks while retaining the potentially diﬀerent eﬀects of
17Note that this is not the case when we consider a stochastic trend, as in the appendix.
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these on the variables in the system.
The specification described in equation 2.1 relies on two assumptions: (i)
government spending shocks are a surprise to agents and (ii) government spend-
ing cannot react within one quarter to other shocks aﬀecting the economy.
However, it could be the case that government spending plans are anticipated
by agents, which would violate assumption (i) above. This possible mistim-
ing of events has been voiced as a criticism of SVAR approaches such as that
expressed by equation 2.1 (Ramey (2011a)). To avoid this potential issue, I
use the measure of news about future government spending (as a percentage
of GDP) described in Ramey (2011a) to identify exogenous shocks.18
Regarding the second assumption, it could be argued that the intervention
lag of one quarter taken by the fiscal authorities to respond to developments in
the economy, assumed in the previous subsection, is more likely to be violated
during times of R or HU (since it could be the case that governments will act
faster in passing bills in such times). This would cause a problem of a lack
of exogeneity. The use of narrative identification of shocks using news about
defence spending again allows us to deal with this problem, since the defence
news variable is more likely to be driven by exogenous foreign political events,
wars, etc (Ramey (2011a)).
I now estimate a VAR that explicitly incorporates the structural shocks to
government spending, namely εRameyt , or news about defence spending:
xt = B(L)xt−1 +C(L)Htε
Ramey
t +D(L)(1−Ht)εRameyt + ξt (2.5)
18Ramey (2011a) constructs a time series of the expected discounted values of government
spending changes by obtaining quantitative information about estimated defence spending
from periodicals (hence its name of narrative identification). A simpler approach based on
the same strategy can be found in Ramey and Shapiro (1998), where the authors use war
dates to identify exogenous changes in defence spending.
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As before, B(L) is a lag polynomial of order p and C(L) and D(L) are
lag polynomials of order q.19 ξt is a residual with normal distribution. As
in equation 2.1, the above model allows for government spending shocks to
have diﬀerential eﬀects, both dynamically and on impact, depending on the
evolution of features of the economy controlled by Ht.20 However, the key
diﬀerence from the model in equation 2.1 is that the structural shocks εRameyt
are now assumed to be observable variables.21
When we exclude diﬀerential eﬀects of government spending shocks due to
economic conditions (i.e. Ht = 0 for all periods), equation 2.5 reduces to the
standard linear case considered in Ramey (2011a):
xt = B(L)xt−1 + F (L)ε
Ramey
t + ξt (2.6)
To compare these results to others in the literature, I start by estimating
equation 2.6. Figure 2.5 shows the responses of the variables in the system to
a positive shock in government spending that raises government spending by
1% at its peak. As before, the figure also shows the 68% and 95% confidence
intervals, computed using a non-parametric bootstrap method. The response
of output peaks after the second year with an elasticity of 0.47 (multiplier
of 0.52), although it is mostly insignificantly diﬀerent from 0 throughout the
horizon (20 quarters). Ramey (2011a) finds a positive and significant response
of output when including data from WWII (and other controls, such as the
interest rate), although she also finds a similar response to the one found here
when excluding both WWII and the Korean War. She concludes that the
19Following similar studies such as Romer and Romer (2010), I set q = 12.
20When Ht takes a value of 1, the contemporaneous and dynamic eﬀects of the shock
εRameyt are given by the matrix C(L). Conversely, when Ht = 0 these eﬀects are controlled
by the matrix D(L).
21Section 4.5 relaxes the assumption that the structural shocks εRameyt are perfectly
observable and considers the case of shocks measured with error.
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Figure 2.5: Responses in the linear model (narrative identification)
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Responses to a government spending shock (identified from narrative accounts of defence
spending) in a linear model. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using a
non-parametric bootstrap.
variable of defence shocks is not informative enough for the post-Korean-War
sample.
The results change dramatically when we allow for nonlinear eﬀects as con-
sidered in equation 2.5. Figure 2.6 show the responses to a positive shock to
government spending for the case where Ht takes a value of 1 during periods of
HU as described above. Interestingly, responses of output during both states
(LU in the top panel in blue, and HU in the bottom panel in red) are now
mostly significant. The signs of the responses follow the same pattern as in the
previous subsection, with output reacting positively to a government spending
shock during LU, and negatively during HU. In periods of LU, following a pos-
itive shock to government spending, output grows by 0.049 and peaks together
with government spending before the second year, with an implied elasticity
of 0.18 (equivalent to a multiplier of 0.54 on impact and one of about 2 at the
peak). Despite the diﬀerence between the two identification approaches, the
responses during HU are very similar to those obtained using the Blanchard-
Perotti restrictions. Output falls by almost -0.04 on impact and reaches -0.4
at the end of the first year (which implies an impact multiplier of -0.4, and
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Figure 2.6: Responses during times of LU and HU (narrative identification)
0 4 8 12 16 20
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
GDP (LU)
pe
rc
en
t
quarter
0 4 8 12 16 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
GOV (LU)
pe
rc
en
t
quarter
0 4 8 12 16 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
TAXREV (LU)
pe
rc
en
t
quarter
0 4 8 12 16 20
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
GDP (HU)
pe
rc
en
t
quarter
0 4 8 12 16 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
GOV (HU)
pe
rc
en
t
quarter
0 4 8 12 16 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
TAXREV (HU)
pe
rc
en
t
quarter
The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel
(in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. The 68% and 95% confidence
bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
-4.35 at the peak).
Surprisingly, while the linear estimation (Figure 2.5) showed little response
of output to a government spending shock, the nonlinear estimation uncovers
a very diﬀerent scenario: output reacts positively (and strongly) during times
of LU and negatively during times of HU (in a magnitude very similar to that
found in the previous identification approach).
Figure 2.7 shows the responses when Ht takes a value of 1 during periods
of R. Again, the response of output is significantly diﬀerent from 0 at most
forecast horizons (as opposed to in the linear case). Output reacts positively
to a government spending shock during times of B: it peaks at 0.13 together
with government spending at the end of the third year, implying a multiplier
of 1.4. The response of output is negative when the shock happens during a
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Figure 2.7: Responses during times of B and R (narrative identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red)
shows responses during times of recession. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed
using a non-parametric bootstrap.
time of R, although in this case the response is noticeably larger in magnitude
(elasticity of -0.7). The responses of government spending, as in the case of
HU and LU, are persistent.
The narrative identification approach corroborates the results obtained in
the previous subsection: the response of output to a government spending
shock depends on the evolution of features of the economy such as the level of
uncertainty or the state of the business cycle. The nonlinear estimation also
oﬀers a diﬀerent view to that of the linear case when using the Ramey (2011a)
narrative variable, showing that government spending is in fact a powerful
instrument in stimulating output (during times of B or LU).
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2.2.3 Understanding the Results
Why do high levels of uncertainty or a recessionary economy aﬀect the impact
of exogenous changes in government spending? The above analysis suggests
that there is a mechanism that operates diﬀerently when the economy is in a
state of HU (or R). In this subsection, I consider the role of a change in confi-
dence as the device inducing the diﬀering responses in the empirical analysis.22
I interpret a shift from times of LU to HU as a deterioration in the informa-
tion set available to agents.23 In a context of scarce information, households
may become more cautious, rendering their confidence sensitive to signals that
may confirm their pessimism about their future income levels.
In such a situation, an increase in government spending could serve to
corroborate the idea that the productivity of the economy was low, triggering
a shift to pessimism among households. The likely result of the deterioration
in households’ confidence would be that consumption would decrease in view
of potentially low levels of income. Firms would respond to this decrease in
demand by lowering production and prices, which would have a contractionary
eﬀect on the overall economy.
To support this conjecture, I analyse the responses of some relevant vari-
ables to a government spending shock.24 Figure 2.8 shows the responses of
22I focus on a mechanism that acts diﬀerently during times of HU and times of LU
(rather than during times of B and times of R). Although uncertainty could be endogenously
generated during R (see Bloom (2014) for a discussion), the definition of periods of HU here
is mostly based on exogenous events (Bloom (2009)), which makes uncertainty a better
candidate with which to explain the above results. Since periods of HU and R do not always
overlap, we could test which is the ultimate driving force behind the diﬀering responses
observed above (heightened uncertainty or a slack economy). Unfortunately, the data are
too scarce for us to draw conclusive results on this.
23This can be due to scarce information or a reduction in its accuracy. As defined by
Frank Knight (1921), uncertainty is found in situations where agents cannot attach proba-
bility distributions to some events. This represents the inability of agents to form accurate
predictions about, for example, the level of productivity in the economy or the income levels
expected by households.
24I use narrative identification based on Ramey’s news about defence spending. Following
Burnside et al. (2004) and Ramey (2011a), I use the fixed set of variables xt described above
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three measures of confidence to a government spending shock during times of
LU and HU. The first two columns correspond to the Consumer Confidence In-
dex (CCI) and the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), two popular measures
of households’ confidence.25 Both variables react positively to a government
spending shock when it takes place during a time of LU, but decrease when
shocks occur during times of HU (the CCI decreases markedly and signifi-
cantly while the ICS does so in a less significant manner). The third column
of Figure 2.8 plots the response of an indicator of industrial confidence in the
manufacturing sector (the Business Conditions Indicator from the OECD),
which behaves similarly. This evidence suggests that government spending
shocks lower the confidence of agents if they occur during times of heightened
uncertainty, while they boost their confidence during normal times.
This shift towards pessimism translates into a higher demand for precau-
tionary savings by households. Figure 2.9 shows a significant reduction in
consumption in response to government spending shocks during times of HU.
In such a scenario, firms would optimally respond to declining demand by low-
ering prices. This is consistent with the second column of Figure 2.9, which
shows that actual (dashed line) and expected (solid line) inflation do not react
significantly to the shock during LU, but they decline when the shock occurs
during a time of HU.26 The last column of Figure 2.9 shows the response of
and rotate the new variables of interest into the analysis.
25The CCI measures consumer confidence by using the monthly responses of 5,000 US
households to questions on their current and expected (within the next six months) business,
family income and employment conditions. The CCI is computed as the proportion of
participants that respond positively to these questions. Data for this variable is available
from 1967 Q1 onwards. Similarly, the ICS is computed by combining the proportions of
interviewed people who express favourable opinions on their current and expected (within
the next twelve months) financial situation and the business conditions in the country,
on their expectations for the next five years about the economic situation, and about their
purchases of durable goods in the current period. The ICS uses responses from 500 telephone
interviews and is available from 1960 Q1 onwards.
26Expected inflation is measured by the median inflation forecast over the next 12 months
from the Survey of Consumers (University of Michigan). The results are qualitatively similar
when I use inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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Figure 2.8: Measures of confidence during times of HU and LU (narrative
identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows the responses of diﬀerent measures of consumers’ and firms’
confidence to a government spending shock (identified from narrative accounts of defence
spending) during times of low uncertainty. The measures of confidence include the Consumer
Confidence Index (CCI) provided by the Conference Board (data start in 1967 Q1), the
Index of Consumer Sentiment provided by the University of Michigan (data start in 1960
Q1) and the Business Conditions Indicator from the OECD (data start in 1950 Q1). The
bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. The 68% and 95%
confidence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 2.9: Further responses during times of HU and LU (narrative identifi-
cation)
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The top panel (in blue) shows the responses of diﬀerent measures of consumers’ confidence to
a government spending shock (identified from narrative accounts of defence spending) during
times of low uncertainty. The broken lines represent realised inflation, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index. Expected inflation is measured by the median inflation forecast
over the next 12 months from the Survey of Consumers (University of Michigan). Interest
rates are measured using the three-month Treasury bill. The bottom panel (in red) shows
the responses during times of high uncertainty. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are
computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
interest rates to a government spending shock. As could be expected from the
response of the monetary authority to developments in inflation, the interest
rate declines after a shock during a time of HU (and remains roughly constant
after a shock that occurs in a time of LU).
2.2.4 Relation to Other Studies
The empirical results in this chapter suggest that government spending shocks
have negative eﬀects on output during recessions. Other studies arrive at the
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opposite conclusion: recessions make government spending more expansionary
than booms. In order to understand why these findings are so diﬀerent, I
now compare these results with those of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012),
whose study is one of the most prominent in this area.27
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) use a Smooth-Transition VAR to in-
vestigate the variation in the response of output between periods of R and B.
They estimate the following model:
xt =
(
1−HAGt−1
)
CB(L)xt−1 +HAGt−1CRxt−1 + et (2.7)
HAGt =
exp(−γzt)
1 + exp(−γzt) (2.8)
et ∼ N
(
0,ΩB
(
1−HAGt−1
)
+ΩR
(
HAGt−1
))
(2.9)
var(zt) = 1 , E(zt) = 0 (2.10)
where xt is the same vector of variables as defined above. The model allows
for a diﬀerential impact of the government spending shock both contempo-
raneously (through matrices ΩB and ΩR) and dynamically (through matrices
CB(L) andCR(L)) during booms and recessions. The transition between these
two states is governed by a logistic function HAGt that depends on the variable
zt, which is defined as the centred moving average (MA) of order 7 of the
growth rate of real GDP.
Despite an apparently similar framework, the results generated by the two
diﬀerent estimation approaches (the model described by equation 2.7 and those
described by equations 2.1 and 2.5) are very diﬀerent: Auerbach and Gorod-
27Ramey and Zubairy (2014) propose a diﬀerent estimation method using local projec-
tions (see Section 4.5) and historical data from 1889 to 2011. They find no significant
diﬀerences in responses during periods of B and R. However, when their methodology and
data are used for the post-War period used in this chapter, the results are very similar to
those presented in Section 2.2 (with output contracting after positive government spending
shocks during times of R).
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nichenko (2012) find that a government spending shock that occurs during a
time of R has a positive and larger eﬀect than the same shock occurring during
a time of B.
Why do similar estimation methods yield such contrasting results? The
answer to this question rests on the information used to determine the current
state of the economy. Equation 2.7 uses a continuous variable determined by
a centred MA of the growth rate of real GDP, while equation 2.1 includes a
binary variable that follows the NBER definition of recession.28 Constructing
HAGt−1 in equation 2.7 in such a way has potentially important implications. By
using a centred MA of order j (a two-sided MA filter), at any given period of
time, we are making use of future developments in GDP to inform about the
current state of the economy. For example, in period t, whether the economy
is in recession or expansion will be determined by information up to period
t + (j − 1)/2. In the event of an incoming change in the business cycle (e.g.
from an expansion to a recession), we could potentially be mislabelling the
current state of the economy.
In order to determine whether the nature of the two-sided MA filter can
explain the diﬀerences between the two sets of results, I replicate the bench-
mark analysis in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for diﬀerent sizes of the
centred MA of the growth rate of real GDP. Figure 2.10 shows the responses of
GDP and government spending to a positive shock to the latter during times
of B and R when varying the size of the MA from 5 up to 19. The results
suggest that the impact of the shock on GDP does depend on the size of the
MA filter: using a high-order MA (i.e. using more information that has not
yet occurred) reduces the eﬀect of the shock during times of B (with the eﬀect
even becoming negative in the medium run) and augments it during times of R.
28When I redefine HAGt−1 in equation 2.7 to be a dummy variable, the results are qualita-
tively similar.
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When the size of the benchmark specification in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) (a MA of order 7) is reduced to a MA of order 5, the results become
qualitatively the same as those described earlier in this chapter: a government
spending shock has a positive eﬀect on GDP during times of B and a negative
eﬀect during times of R.
Next, I analyse how the results in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)
would be aﬀected if the centred MA were substituted by a one-sided MA filter
(i.e. keeping the length of the MA filter constant, but altering its symmetry).
Figure 2.11 shows the responses to a government spending shock when I use (i)
the benchmark specification (centred MA of order 7), (ii) a one-sided MA filter
of order 7 that only uses past information and (iii) a one-sided MA filter that
exclusively uses future information.29 The results confirm that, when not using
information about the future (i.e. when the MA is only backward-looking), the
response of output becomes more similar to those obtained from equations 2.1
and 2.5: a government spending shock has positive eﬀects during a period of
B, but negative ones during a period of R (while the opposite is true when a
forward-looking MA filter is used).
I conclude that the diﬀerences between the results presented in this chapter
and those in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) respond to the information
used to explain changes in the state of the economy.30
29Cases in between these two extremes (e.g a MA(7) filter that uses information from the
last two quarters and the next four quarters) support the same conclusions.
30Bognanni (2012) uses a Markov-switching VAR where the probability of recession is
estimated period by period, and finds that the eﬀect of a government spending shock on
activity is smaller during periods of R than B.
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Figure 2.10: Responses during times of R and B using the Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) framework and a two-sided MA filter
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of
boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession. Note that the
graphs in the left column have a diﬀerent scale to facilitate their readability. The responses
are computed using the strategy described in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) but with
variations in the size of the centred moving average of the growth rate of real GDP used to
provide information about changes in the regime.
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Figure 2.11: Responses during times of R and B using the Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) framework and a one-sided MA filter
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of
boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession. The responses
are computed using the strategy described in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) but with
variations made to the centring of the moving average (MA) of the growth rate of real GDP
used to provide information about changes in the regime. Forward MA(7) is a one-sided
MA filter of order 7 using future information only; backward MA(7) is a one-sided MA filter
of order 7 using exclusively past information.
46
Chapter 2. Is Fiscal Policy More Eﬀective in Uncertain Times or During
Recessions?
2.3 Robustness
2.3.1 Alternative Timing of Uncertainty Events
In this subsection I analyse the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
definition of the episodes of HU. In Section 2.2, these were defined as quar-
ters containing any month with unusually high stock market volatility (1.65
standard deviations above a Hodrick-Prescott trend). The advantage of this
approach is that it produces a larger number of periods of HU (32 quarters).
I now strictly apply the definition of episodes of HU in Bloom (2009) and
consider only those quarters that contain months of peak volatility.31
To assess whether this change of definition aﬀects the results, I estimate
equations 2.1 and 2.5 again using the alternative definition of HU. Figure 2.12
displays the results of a government spending shock identified using the SVAR
approach (equation 2.1). The response of the variables during times of LU is
almost unchanged between the alternative (solid line) and benchmark (dashed
line) definition of episodes of uncertainty. During times of HU, the response
of output is fairly similar for both definitions during the first two years after
the shock. The most noticeable diﬀerence is that the alternative definition
produces more persistent eﬀects of the shock.
Next, I consider the case of the narrative identification of government
spending shocks (equation 2.5). Figure 2.13 plots the results for this case.
The responses of the variables during LU is are almost identical for both defi-
nitions of uncertainty. When considering times of HU, the response of output
is again very similar in each case during the first two years. The magnitude
31For example, from 2002 Q3 to 2003 Q1 stock market volatility was 1.65 standard
deviations above the trend, due to the second Gulf War. In the benchmark definition of
episodes of HU this resulted in three quarters of HU. In the alternative definition proposed
now, I only consider the quarter with the highest volatility (in this case, 2003 Q1).
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Figure 2.12: Responses under alternative definition of HU events (SVAR iden-
tification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
exclusion restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows
responses during times of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point estimates for
the alternative definition of HU events. The dashed lined plots the point estimates for the
benchmark definition used in Section 2.2. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed
using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure 2.13: Responses under alternative definition of HU events (Narrative
identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel
(in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point
estimates for the alternative definition of HU events. The dashed lined plots the point
estimates for the benchmark definition used in Section 2.2. The 68% and 95% confidence
bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
of the decline in output is larger for the alternative definition (dashed line)
between the second and fifth years of the horizon.
We can conclude that the finding of diﬀerent signs of the responses of output
during times of HU and LU is robust when we consider uncertainty episodes
as defined by quarters of peak stock market volatility.
2.3.2 Local Projections
Equations 2.1 and 2.5 both imply restrictions on the responses of the variables
to structural shocks. Responses are linear when conditioning on a given state
and are therefore history-independent. This is equivalent to assuming that
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fiscal policy, through government spending, cannot change the regime from
HU to LU (or from R to B) or vice versa. While uncertainty is defined here as
exogenous events (most of the episodes of HU are not economics-related), these
events are mostly short-lived. It is also plausible to believe that government
spending can influence the economic situation. Although these shortcomings
are less likely to appear in the short run, I follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) in using a methodology that takes these
issues into account. I use the local projection methodology proposed in Jorda`
(2005), which relaxes the assumption that the state of the nonlinear model
remains fixed throughout the entire horizon of the impulse response analysis.
The local projection methodology estimates a series of single equations over
the horizon h:
xt+h = Ht−1
[
αL,h + βL,hxt−1 + δL,hεGt
]
+
(1−Ht−1)
[
αH,h + βH,hxt−1 + δH,hεGt
]
+ et+h
(2.11)
where xt = [gt, yt, trt]′ is the vector of variables defined in the previous section
and xt is one of the variables of interest in xt. Note that equation 2.11 allows
for the coeﬃcients to change for each horizon h. The coeﬃcient δL,h measures
the response of the variable xt to a government spending shock εGt during
state L (which represents times of LU or B) and, conversely, δH,h captures the
response during state H (times of HU or R). The responses of the variable of
interest to government spending shocks during state L (or H) are given by a
series of δL,h (or δH,h) obtained from each regression h.
I apply the above method using both of the identification schemes men-
tioned earlier. Thus, εGt represents either the government spending variable
(to achieve the Blanchard-Perotti SVAR identification) or Ramey’s news about
defence spending (narrative identification).
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Figure 2.14: Responses during times of LU and HU computed using local
projections (SVAR identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified using
exclusion restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows re-
sponses during times of high uncertainty. Responses are computed using the local projection
method as described in Jorda` (2005). The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed
using a non-parametric bootstrap.
Figure 2.14 shows the responses to a government spending shock identified
as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) when equation 2.11 is allowed to vary
between states of HU or LU. The response of output is positive and significant
during times of LU. During times of HU, the point estimate (solid line) is not
significant during the first two years and then becomes negative. This figure
also displays the point estimate when the episodes of HU are identified using
the alternative measure of uncertainty explained in the previous subsection
(dashed line). This estimate is negative and significant (confidence intervals
for this estimation are not shown) throughout the entire impulse response
horizon.
I now replicate the same analysis but using the narrative identification ap-
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Figure 2.15: Responses during times of LU and HU, computed using local
projections (narrative identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel
(in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. The responses are computed using
the local projection method as described in Jorda` (2005). The 68% and 95% confidence bands
are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
proach for the government spending shock. Figure 2.15 displays the responses.
As in the previous case, the response of output is positive and mostly sig-
nificant during times of LU. The sign of this response becomes negative and
significant when the shock happens during a time of HU. The same result ob-
tains when we consider the alternative definition of HU (dashed line) although
the magnitude of the decline in output is significantly larger.32
Finally, I consider the business cycle conditions (R or B) to be the drivers
of the nonlinearities in equation 2.11. Figure 2.16 plots the responses to gov-
ernment spending shocks identified using the SVAR framework. In times of B,
32Note that these responses, unlike those shown in Section 2.2, are not scaled to the
government spending shock, since we are estimating single equations.
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Figure 2.16: Responses during times of B and R, computed using local projec-
tions (SVAR identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified using
exclusion restrictions) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses
during times of recession. The responses are computed using the local projection method
as described in Jorda` (2005). The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using a
non-parametric bootstrap.
the response of output is positive and mostly significant. During times of R,
the response is negative during the first year but only significant up to 68%,
and then fluctuates for the rest of the horizon considered (increasing after the
fourth year).
Figure 2.17 displays the responses when the government spending shock is
identified following the narrative approach. The response of output is positive
but small during times of B. During times of R, output declines during the
first year and remains negative or close to zero up to the fourth year (after
which it increases), although the levels of significance are low.
To summarise, the local projection framework shows that the nonlinear re-
sponses due to diﬀerent levels of uncertainty are not caused by the restriction
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Figure 2.17: Responses during times of B and R, computed using local projec-
tions (narrative identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red)
shows responses during times of recession. The responses are computed using the local
projection method as described in Jorda` (2005). The 68% and 95% confidence bands are
computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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imposed by the VAR (i.e. the state remaining fixed for the whole impulse
response horizon). The results are, however, less clear when we consider non-
linearities due to the state of the business cycle.
2.3.3 Alternative Identification Strategy
In this subsection I use a diﬀerent strategy to identify the government spending
shocks. In Section 2.2 I used the Ramey (2011a) narrative shock of news about
defence spending as the true structural shock to government spending. One
might suppose that this series could be contaminated by measurement errors.
I now follow Mertens and Ravn (2013) and consider the possibility that the
narrative shocks are not the true structural shocks but a measure correlated
with them. I assume as well that this measure, the proxy, is orthogonal to other
structural shocks. These assumptions give us extra identification restrictions
(exploiting the correlation between the proxy and the reduced form residuals
of the SVAR) that can be used in conjunction with the covariance restrictions
from the VAR in equation 2.1 to identify the structural shocks to government
spending.33
Figure 2.18 plots the responses when using this alternative identification,
for the case of HU versus LU. The response of output follows a similar pattern
to that in the benchmark results: it increases as a result of a government
spending shock during a time of LU but becomes negative when the shock
takes place during a time of HU, with a magnitude very similar to the results
presented in Section 2.2.
Next I consider the case of responses to government spending shocks during
33Note that we no longer need the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) exclusion restrictions on
the contemporaneous impact of a government spending shock in order to achieve identifica-
tion.
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Figure 2.18: Responses during times of LU and HU (proxy identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of low
uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty.
Government spending shocks are identified using the Ramey (2011a) news about defence
spending as a proxy for the true structural shocks. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are
computed using the Gonc¸alves and Kilian (2004) wild bootstrap.
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Figure 2.19: Proxy identification, R versus B
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of B.
The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of R. Government spending shocks
are identified using the Ramey (2011a) news about defence spending as a proxy for the true
structural shocks. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using the Gonc¸alves
and Kilian (2004) wild bootstrap.
times of R or B.34 Figure 2.19 shows that the response of output is positive
during times of B. Output declines during times of R, with an implied elasticity
of the output peak to the government spending peak of -0.3% after the first
year. The magnitude of this response falls between the results obtained in
Section 2.2 for the SVAR and narrative identification approaches.
2.3.4 Alternative Narrative Measure
In Section 2.2 I used the Ramey (2011a) news about defence spending as
the government spending shocks. Ramey (2011a) produces a second narrative
34I find that the results during times of B are very imprecisely estimated when we include
the recession of 1949. In this particular case I consider 1950 Q1 as the starting date of the
sample. The results for the case of Rare not dependent on this consideration.
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Figure 2.20: Responses in the linear case (alternative narrative identification)
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Responses in the linear model after a government spending shock identified using Ramey
(2011a) defence spending forecast errors. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed
using a non-parametric bootstrap.
measure: news shocks based on the one-quarter-ahead forecast error of defence
spending by professional forecasters.35 Ramey (2011a) reports that shocks to
this variable are associated with decreasing output.36 I find similar results
when I estimate the linear version of equation 2.5 with these shocks (as shown
in Figure 2.20).37
I want to investigate whether the response of output is still qualitatively
diﬀerent across states when we consider this alternative identification of gov-
ernment spending shocks. I estimate equation 2.5, allowing for nonlinearities
due to periods of HU or LU but using the new narrative measure. Figure 2.21
shows the responses after a government spending shock in this case. During
times of LU the response of output is positive on impact, before becoming
negative and then insignificant (the point estimation becomes positive again
after the third year, in contrast with the linear case displayed in Figure 2.20
35Ramey (2011a) suggests that the explanatory power of the defence news variables may
be lower when the sample starts after WWII and the Korean War (I include only the latter),
the two major events of increases in government spending.
36Ramey says: “these shocks lead to rather contractionary eﬀects, similar to those I found
for the 1955 to 2008 period with my defence news shocks”, a statement that I have illustrated
in Figure 2.5.
37The sample starts in 1969 Q1, restricted by the availability of the data.
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Figure 2.21: Responses during periods of HU and LU (alternative narrative
identification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of low
uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty.
Government spending shocks are identified using Ramey (2011a) defence spending forecast
errors. The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
in which it remained negative during the entire period). When considering the
response of output during times of HU, we again observe a large and significant
decline following the shock, as in the results presented in Section 2.2.
I now consider the case of the impact of a government spending shock dur-
ing times of R and B. Figure 2.22 shows the responses for this case. We again
observe an initially positive response of output during times of B, becoming
negative (and then insignificant) after the third quarter. The response of out-
put during times of R is negative and significant, as observed in the benchmark
results.
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Figure 2.22: Responses during periods of R and B (alternative narrative iden-
tification)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock during times of
boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses during times of recession. Government
spending shocks are identified using Ramey (2011a) defence spending forecast errors. The
68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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2.4 Conclusion
The eﬀect of government spending is likely to depend on features of the econ-
omy that evolve over time. In this chapter, I study whether the eﬀects of
changes in government spending remain the same across states of the economy.
In particular, I empirically characterise how changes in government spending
may diﬀer across states of high (HU) and low (LU) uncertainty and across
recessions (R) and booms (B).
The results suggest that the impact of government spending shocks on out-
put is positive during times of LU or B and negative during times of HU or R. I
find that households’ confidence is a key variable for interpreting these results,
as agents become more pessimistic when a positive government spending shock
confirms their views on the state of the economy.
Other studies in the literature (such as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012))
produce contrasting results. I explore these diﬀerences by highlighting the im-
portance of the information used to determine the state of the business cycle.
The results documented here provoke new research questions. For example,
we have seen that output contracts after a positive government spending shock
if that shock happens during a time of HU or R. It would be interesting to
identify whether it is HU, R or a combination of both that is causing this eﬀect.
This would require a comparison between a shock that happens in a time of
HU and B and a shock that happens during a time of LU and R. However,
the data are not informative enough for this, since there are just a few events
with these characteristics, insuﬃcient for us to obtain robust results. More
empirical evidence is required to help us shed light on this question.
It is also necessary to understand the mechanism causing these diﬀering
impacts of government spending on the economy. Here I have highlighted
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the importance of households’ confidence in explaining the results. A detailed
theoretical framework that can explain such nonlinear eﬀects would be crucial
for evaluating the consequences of public policies.
I have focused my attention on uncertainty that has an arguably exogenous
origin (e.g. war, terror). However, uncertainty can be generated by endoge-
nous causes, for example by policy itself (see Baker et al. (2013), Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2011) or Bi et al. (2013)).38 Whether and how this source of
fiscal uncertainty can aﬀect real activity are questions left for future research.
38Uncertainty derived from fiscal policy has received attention from the media recently.
See, for example, The Economist (16/11/2013):“Governments, however, are still breeding
fears about the future. The most glaring form of uncertainty in the rich world is fiscal.
[...] This is self-imposed uncertainty. If the fiscal path were a little clearer, the reduction
in uncertainty should spur investment and output, which in turn should improve the fiscal
picture.”
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Taxes on Income
Mobility
3.1 Introduction
The last four decades have witnessed a sustained increase in income and wealth
inequality in the US, particularly at the top end of the distribution.1 This
phenomenon has received substantial attention in academic research,2 policy
debates as mentioned in President Obama’s Economic Report (see Council of
Economic Advisers (2015)), and popular opinion (e.g. protest movements such
as Occupy Wall Street). As noted in Arrow and Intriligator (2015), inequality
is a highly relevant normative issue, since society perceives an unequal distribu-
tion of income as an unjust outcome of market economies. However, there are
other features of the income distribution beyond inequality that have welfare
implications for the society and are relevant from a policy point of view. Over-
1See Piketty and Saez (2003) for long-run trends in income inequality and Saez and
Zucman (2014) or Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2015) for the case of wealth.
2Piketty (2014) provides extensive evidence of income and wealth inequality around the
world while Stiglitz (2012) highlights its consequences: “the impact of inequality on societies
is now increasingly well understood -higher crime, health problems, and mental illness, lower
educational achievements, social cohesion and life expectancy” (inside cover).
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looking some of these aspects may yield an incomplete or inaccurate picture
of the eﬀects of policies that address economic disparities.
This chapter looks at the impact of fiscal policy on another aspect of the
income distribution diﬀerent to inequality. Particularly, I investigate the rela-
tionship between taxes and income mobility. While inequality reflects changes
in the variance (and higher moments) of the income distribution, income mo-
bility is the result of variations in the covariance of income between two periods
of time.3 For any given level of income inequality, mobility reduces the associa-
tion between the positions of origin and destination in the income distribution,
increasing equality of opportunity. Therefore, to the extent that income mo-
bility is a desirable feature of an economy, it is then relevant to consider how
fiscal policy may aﬀect it.4
I analyse the impact of taxes on the probability of moving in the income
distribution in the US using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID). I measure income mobility as changes in the relative position of
households in the income distribution (i.e. changes in deciles or quintiles)
across time. Income is defined as the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of the
household. I assess the degree of mobility across three specifications for the in-
come distribution that consider pre-tax income, post-tax income and post-tax
and post-transfer income respectively. Then, I construct the federal individual
tax liabilities faced by each household in the sample using the NBER TAXSIM
simulator. With these data in hand, I estimate a linear probability model to
understand how changes in the marginal tax rate aﬀect the likelihood that
households are mobile in the income distribution during two adjacent years.
My identification approach accounts for endogeneity in the marginal rates by
3See Gottschalk (1997).
4Kopczuk et al. (2010) argue for the need to study income inequality and mobility jointly.
Income mobility is a determinant of inequality in the long run: when there is no mobility in
the income distribution, short-run inequality perpetuates.
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isolating the variation in taxes that is only due to legislative changes. I exploit
this source of exogenous variation as an instrument in the regressions.
The results obtained suggest that higher marginal tax rates reduce income
mobility. Particularly, I find that an increase of one percentage point in the
marginal rate is associated with declines of about 0.5-1.3% in the probability of
changing deciles of income. A decrease of 7 percentage points in the marginal
tax rate (slightly smaller than a standard deviation of non-zero changes in
the rates) can account for about a tenth of the average income mobility in
a year. The eﬀect of taxes on mobility arises in specifications that consider
income distributions both before and after taxes and transfers, suggesting that
the impact of taxation on mobility goes beyond redistribution eﬀects. The
economic mechanism that induces this impact seems to be related to the labour
market incentives created by changes in the tax schedule. Additional results
suggest that the eﬀect of taxation on income mobility diﬀers according to the
level of human capital (measured as the education of the head of the household)
and that it is particularly significant when considering mobility at the bottom
of the distribution.
The evidence that taxes have a negative impact on income mobility has
important implications for the design of policies that aim to address economic
disparities. While some studies have pointed out to the importance of progres-
sive taxation in addressing inequality,5 the results from this paper suggest that
such changes may have a detrimental impact on income mobility. Therefore,
the design of optimal fiscal policy should consider the overall impact on welfare
of the trade-oﬀ that might arise when jointly addressing income inequality and
mobility.
This chapter relates to diﬀerent strands of literature. First, it is connected
5See Piketty and Saez (2007) and Diamond and Saez (2011).
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to the literature that investigates the eﬀects of tax changes on taxable income
(elasticity of taxable income, or ETI), as reviewed in Saez et al. (2012). This
research finds that taxable income only reacts moderately to changes in the
marginal tax rate.6 Mertens (2013) suggests that accounting for empirical
diﬃculties in the estimation of the ETI at the aggregate level (such as policy
endogeneity or timing) results in larger elasticities for diﬀerent income groups
beyond the top earners. This chapter relates to some methodological aspects
of this literature,7 but I focus on the eﬀects of taxes on measures of household’s
mobility across the income distribution as opposed to the individual’s response
of reported taxable income (for this purpose I employ a diﬀerent type of data,
the PSID, that allows me to control for relevant demographic factors).
This paper relates to an extensive literature on income mobility surveyed in
Fields and Ok (1999) and Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015).8 Early works on the mea-
surement of income mobility include Shorrocks (1978a) and Shorrocks (1978b),
which lay down many of the tools currently used to measure mobility. A num-
ber of papers have investigated the degree and evolution of mobility in terms
of income (broadly defined) and earnings. Hungerford (1993) uses family in-
come data from the PSID to analyse trends in mobility, focusing on changes in
the position in the income distribution between 7 year-periods in both annual
6Saez et al. (2012) suggest a range of estimates from 0.12 to 0.40 for the ETI. The authors
argue that responses for the top-earners can be substantially higher. For example, Slemrod
(1996) finds that the Tax Revenue Act of 1986 explains to a large extent the increase in
reported income of the top earners.
7I use variation in legislated taxes to address endogeneity following Gruber and Saez
(2002).
8During this chapter, I will refer to income mobility as intragenerational mobility. Ja¨ntti
and Jenkins (2015) also survey the literature on intergenerational or social mobility (the de-
gree of association between parents and children income). There has been a recent increase
in the research aiming to understand the degree of intergenerational mobility and its factors.
For example, Chetty et al. (2014a) analyses the geographical diﬀerences of intergenerational
mobility in the US and Chetty et al. (2014b) explores its evolution over time, which has
remained fairly constant despite rising inequality. The determinants of social mobility are
explored in Chetty and Hendren (2015), who investigate how neighbourhoods aﬀect inter-
generational mobility through childhood exposure eﬀects.
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and permanent income. The author compares mobility between the 1970s and
1980s to find considerable movement within the income distribution (although
he finds less evidence of sizeable upward or downward movements). Also us-
ing PSID data, Gottschalk (1997) looks at earnings mobility in one-year and
seventeen-year periods. The author concludes that the degree of mobility is
high enough to support the view that people are not stuck at the bottom or
the at top of the distribution. Kopczuk et al. (2010) employs individual data
from the Social Security Administration to investigate the evolution of both
short-term mobility (measured by changes in rank correlation in year-to-year
earnings and in mobility indices defined over periods of 3-5 years) and long-
term mobility (i.e. across the working life). More recently, Bradbury (2011)
looks at various indices of income mobility using the PSID between 1969-2006
and time intervals spanning 11 years.
Although the concepts of mobility and samples used diﬀer, these papers
find a similar evolution of mobility in the US: a relatively flat profile during
the 1970s and a somewhat decreasing trend after that. I measure mobility in
comparable ways to this literature, however, since my main goal is to identify
the eﬀects of tax changes, I instead consider mobility across two adjacent
years.9
The literature on the eﬀect of taxes on income mobility is more limited.
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) analyse the eﬀects of the 1991 tax reform on
the income distribution recognising two potential channels: higher taxes can
reduce the income gaps between people and, in some cases, change their relative
position by means of redistribution. The authors decompose the evolution of
the Gini coeﬃcient due to income changes holding the relative position constant
9Gottschalk (1997) notes that accounting for longer periods is not necessarily more
appropriate than one-year periods to analyse mobility and inequality, given the fact that
low-income households are more likely to face borrowing constraints over longer horizons.
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and due to changes in the relative position holding income constant, and find
that this second eﬀect is important in understanding the redistribution eﬀects
of the the 1991 tax reform. Larrimore et al. (2015) analyse the determinants of
income mobility between two-year periods using a panel of tax returns between
1999 and 2011. They compute the diﬀerence between income before and after
federal taxes as a measure of the stabilising power of taxes.
In contrast to both Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) and Larrimore et al. (2015),
I analyse the eﬀects of taxes on mobility that can also be due to changes on the
pre-tax income (i.e. because of a change in the labour supply), not only due
to the redistribution eﬀect of the tax system. More substantially, this chapter
uses a diﬀerent methodology to asses the impact of taxes on income mobility
by exploiting exogenous variation in the marginal tax rates, over a relatively
long panel of data that includes several tax reforms.
This chapter also relates to the literature that investigates the aggregate
impact of taxes such as Romer and Romer (2010) and Barro and Redlick
(2011). Both studies find substantial eﬀects of changes in taxes on economic
activity. Romer and Romer (2010) estimate the impact of a tax increase of 1
percent of GDP to amount to a reduction of output by 3% over the course of
three years. Barro and Redlick (2011) find that the eﬀect of taxes on GDP
act mainly through substitution eﬀects, with increases in the average marginal
tax rates significantly reducing GDP.10 Mertens and Ravn (2013) highlight the
importance of distinguishing between diﬀerent type of taxes, estimating large
eﬀects of taxes on output in the short run. Zidar (2015) exploits variation
in US states to find aggregate eﬀects on employment resulting from tax cuts
for lower-income groups (as opposed to tax cuts for the top 10% of the in-
come distributions, which are not found to have a large eﬀect on employment
10Barro and Redlick (2011) find that GDP falls 1.1 for each dollar increase in federal
taxes, with one year lag.
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growth).
Income and wealth inequality have been the object of extensive study in
macroeconomics.11 Piketty and Saez (2003) use a long panel of tax returns
to analyse income inequality trends in the US since 1917. The authors find
that income inequality, as measured by the share of income by the top decile
earners, sharply decreased during World War II and started to increase from
the 1970s.12 Piketty (2014) compiles extensive empirical evidence on the evo-
lution of income and wealth inequality for the US and other countries, finding
a noticeable increase in both variables. The author suggests that this increase
in inequality is a feature of capitalist economies (given that the rate of return
of capital is found to exceed that of economic growth) and advocates for fis-
cal reforms that establish a global wealth tax and a more progressive income
taxation.
In order to understand the causes of wealth inequality, macroeconomic
models have relaxed the assumption of a representative agent, allowing for
heterogeneity in earnings and other characteristics, in the spirit of Aiyagari
(1994).13 Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2015) survey the literature on the theories
used the explain the causes of inequality, and its implications for the aggre-
gate economy. While economic models predict that wealthy households tend
to dissave, this is at odds with the data. De Nardi (2015) surveys the mech-
anisms that have been used to explain the reasons for wealthy individuals to
exhibit a high rate of savings and its implications for wealth inequality. This
literature has found that diﬀerences in the degree of patience among individ-
uals, the transmission of human capital (skills passed from parents to chil-
11Aghion et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between innovativeness and both top-
income inequality and social mobility.
12Building on the same dataset, Saez and Zucman (2014) capitalise income to produce a
measure of wealth inequality, and find that this variable has substantially increased in the
last few years.
13See Heathcote et al. (2009).
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dren) and voluntary bequests across generations or the decisions to become
an entrepreneur are plausible reasons that can explain some aspects of the
distribution of wealth.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 develops a simple
framework to understand the relevant mechanisms behind the eﬀect of taxation
and income mobility. Section 3.3 describes how the data regarding income
mobility and taxes are constructed. The empirical strategy and the main
results are described in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 contains several robustness
checks. Further empirical results on the heterogeneous eﬀects of taxes on
income mobility are explored in Section 3.6. Lastly, Section 3.7 concludes and
discusses potential extensions.
3.2 A Simple Theoretical Framework
Before turning to the empirical analysis, I consider a simple model of labour
supply to highlight the key determinants of the relationship between taxation
and income mobility.
Consider an economy populated by two households (i = 1, 2) with quasi-
linear preferences:
U(ci,t, ni,t) = σici,t − Xi
1 + 1ηi
n
1+ 1ηi
t
where ci,t and ni,t represent consumption and hours worked for household i
at date t. Preference parameters can potentially depend on each household
characteristics: σi represents the relative weight of consumption in the utility
function, Xi denotes preferences regarding labour supply (which could be de-
termined by demographic variables, family composition, etc.) and ηi ≥ 0 is
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply (a key element in this framework).
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Individuals face a budget constraint ci,t = (wi,tni,t) − T (wi,tni,t), where
wages wi,t evolve exogenously following wi,t = w(1 ± εi,t), with εi > 0. In
each period, wages are equal to w1,t = w(1 + ε1,t) for household i = 1 and
w2,t = w(1 − ε2,t) for household 2 with probability π > 0. With probability
1− π wages become w1,t = w(1− ε1,t) and w2,t = w(1 + ε2,t). The tax system
is assumed to be given as:
T ′(wi,tni,t) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ τ
L + τ if (wi,tni,t) ≥ (1 + ε)wnH∗i,t
τL if (wi,tni,t) < (1 + ε)wnH
∗
i,t
(3.1)
where τL and τL + τ are the marginal tax rates faced by households with a
low or high wage realisation, respectively. nH
∗
i,t and n
L∗
i,t are the labour supply
functions that result from optimality in consumption-leisure decisions:
nH
∗
i,t =
(
(1− τL − τ)(1 + ε)w σi
Xi
)ηi
nL
∗
i,t =
(
(1− τL)(1− ε)w σi
Xi
)ηi
Assuming that preferences are the same for both type of households (η1 =
η2 = η, σ1 = σ2 = σ, X1 = X2 = X), when τ = 0 the tax schedule becomes
proportional and the household with a higher realisation of wages (say, i = 1)
is ranked first in the income distribution:
(1− τL)(1 + ε)wnH∗1,t > (1− τL)(1− ε)wnL∗2,t
Conditional on an initial distribution of income, the relative income mobility
in this economy is given by Pr (move|w2,t−1 = w(1 + ε)) = π.
When τ is positive, the tax schedule is progressive and both labour-supply
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functions are related by:
nH
∗
i,t =
((
1− τ
1− τL
)(
1 + ε
1− ε
))η
nL
∗
i,t
In any given period, the optimal labour supply choice weights two opposing
eﬀects: (i) a higher wage 1+ε1−ε increases the price of leisure and makes the
household willing to supply more labour and (ii) a higher rate τ makes the
tax system more progressive and reduces the incentives to supply more hours
of work. As long as τ < (1 − τLt ) 2ε1+ε the household will have incentives to
take advantage of a higher wage draw and will optimally choose to supply
more labour nH
∗
i,t > n
L∗
i,t . When τ is high enough, the tax schedule eliminates
the incentives to work induced by a a high-wage shock. Particularly, when
τ = (1− τLt ) 2ε1+ε the household will decide to not to increase the hours of work
due to the wage shock and nH
∗
i,t = n
L∗
i,t .
14
In the case of τ = (1 − τLt ) 2ε1+ε , both households supply the same amount
of hours worked. In the presence of preference shocks Xi that counteract the
eﬀects of the wage shocks, less progressive taxation would render the labour
supply of the households more sensitive to changes in wages, resulting in higher
income mobility.
This simple framework allows us to derive the following implications. First
and most important, the tax system can reduce income mobility by disincen-
tivizing labour supply. This eﬀect arises because households take less advan-
tage of economic opportunities when the marginal tax rate is very high. The
final eﬀect on mobility depends crucially on the Frisch elasticity of labour sup-
ply (and whether it is homogeneous across households) since this parameter
14When we consider τL = 0.25 (approximately the US average federal marginal tax rate
on individual income during 1967-1996), w = 10 and productivity shocks representing 5%
of the base wage w, then we have that the value of τ such that nH
∗
i,t = n
L∗
i,t is τ = 0.07,
resulting in τL + τ = 0.32.
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governs how much the taxes distort the incentives to work. Preferences regard-
ing consumption also matter. A wealth eﬀect on labour supply, which is absent
in this minimal framework, will make households more willing to supply work
when taxes increase (although this eﬀect will be mitigated by a progressive
tax schedule). Another important factor in determining mobility is the wealth
accumulation. When savings are allowed, households face an intertemporal
optimisation problem. Those households who are lucky and obtain subsequent
realisations of high wages will be able to build up savings. The return ob-
tained from these savings will increase total income, making it less likely to
move down in the income distribution.
Therefore, while taxes are likely to have an eﬀect on income mobility, the
precise impact remains an empirical question. When estimating this eﬀect, it
will be important to use data that allows separating household eﬀects (as, for
example, taste for leisure) from household shocks. The PSID, given its panel
nature, is an attractive dataset to address this question.
3.3 Data and Trends
The PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) is an annual survey elaborated
by the University of Michigan since 1968.15 It follows the same families and
their split-oﬀs over time, creating a panel structure. The survey was originally
created from two samples: the Survey Research Center (SRC) or core sample
(representative at the national level), and the Survey of Economic opportunity
(SEO) or Census sample, which over-represents low income households. The
PSID provides weights that render the combination of both samples represen-
tative of the US population while accounting for the attrition that occurs over
15The survey contains data from 1967, since some of the variables asked (e.g. income)
refer to the previous year.
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time when families are stopped being interviewed.
I restrict the whole sample by considering main adults (the heads and their
spouses) of households that are led by a male working head aged 25 to 60 who
is not self-employed. Following Aaronson and French (2009), families with a
head working less than 300 or more than 4,500 hours per year, earning less
than $3 or more than $200 per hours in 1996 prices are considered outliers
and dropped from the sample. This selection criteria is based on the inten-
tion to reflect changes in the income mobility that arise as a result of labour
market interaction. In Section 3.5, I check the robustness of the results when
considering a more inclusive sample. This selection leads to a total of 5,430
(continuously married) households representing a total of 50,471 observations
between 1967 and 1996. The final date of the sample is dictated by the change
in the PSID frequency produced in 1997 (referring to data from 1996), when
the periodicity of data releases switched from annual to biannual.
3.3.1 Measuring income mobility
This section discusses issues related to income mobility measure and explores
its dynamics in the US over the sample period.
Consider an ordering of income in time t in N diﬀerent ranks (i.e. quantiles
of income). Let snt denote the households with income belonging to rank n ∈
[1, N ]. The mobility process can be represented by a vector st = (s1t , s
2
t , . . . , s
N
t )
and a probability matrix P with dimension n×n and rows adding up to 1 such
that:
st = Ptst−1 (3.2)
The vector st−1 summarises the probability distribution of income in period
t − 1. The matrix P characterises the mobility process by determining the
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probability that a household in income group n at time t − 1 remains in the
same decile next period (entry P n,n in matrix P) or transits to another decile
k ̸= n.16
There are diﬀerent indices that can be used to measure the degree of income
mobility.17 The immobility ratio (IR) summarises changes in relative positions
by computing the degree of concentration along the diagonal of matrix P , i.e.
the fraction of households that remain in the same income group during two
periods of time. In the case of extreme immobility (no household changes
deciles between t and t− 1), IR= 1.
In a similar vein, the normalised trace index (NTI) proposed by Shorrocks
(1978b) uses the elements in the diagonal of P to measure mobility:
NTI =
N − trace(P )
N − 1
When P is the identity matrix, the sum of the diagonal of matrix P is equal
to N and the NTI becomes 0.
Both the IR and NTI indices use information from the diagonal of matrix P .
The Average Jump Index (Bartholomew (1973)) exploits other information in
P to asses the degree of mobility by counting the number of income thresholds
(e.g. deciles) that a households passes through between two periods. This
index is computed as the average of absolute changes in income ranks for all
the sample. A value of 0 indicates perfect immobility (origin independence).
There are other measures that are not restricted to the relative position
of households in the income distribution. This is the case of the Pearson
16In the special case when vector st−1 contains all the necessary information to predict
st, i.e. Prob(st|st−1, st−2,, . . . , st−k) = Prob(st|st−1) ∀k ≥ 1 and t, the process st is said to
be Markovian. P becomes the Markov matrix and transitions along the income distribution
between k periods can be obtained from st+k = stP k.
17See Fields and Ok (1999) or Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015) for exhaustive reviews of the
diﬀerent tools available to measure income mobility.
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correlation (r), defined as:
r = corr
(
log(inct−1), log(inct)
)
where inct is the real level of income at time t. The Hart index (Hart (1976))
is a variant of this measure and is defined by H = 1−r. When income between
two periods is perfectly correlated, we have the case of complete immobility
and H = 0.
Income is constructed as the Adjusted Aggregate Income (AGI) based on
the joint taxable income of the head and spouse in the household.18 Diﬀerent
measures of income (before taxes, after taxes, and after transfers) are used to
assess mobility.
Figure 3.1 plots the evolution of the mobility indices described above using
a pre-tax measure of income, setting N = 10 (income is divided in deciles) and
allowing t to represent a year. While many studies in the literature focus on
a longer horizon to analyse mobility (e.g. five years), I choose to use a shorter
horizon to be able to identify the eﬀect of taxation on income mobility.
The degree of co-movement between the indices of mobility is high: 1-IR
and NTI have a correlation of 95%. The correlation between those two indices
and the measure of income ranks passed is of 90 and 88%, respectively. The
correlation between the Hart index and the rest of mobility measures ranges
between 70 and above 80%.
The evolution of these indices shows a flat profile from the end of the 1960s
to the end of the 1970s, although the NTI index exhibits a slightly upward
trend during this period. Mobility declines somewhat during the decade of
18A broader definition of income would include other sources within the family (e.g.
children or other relatives). However this would require making assumptions on how to
identify tax units within the household and limit the availability of data. Section 3.5 explores
the robustness of the results to diﬀerent definition of income.
76
Chapter 3. The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility
the 80s. It increases more noticeably at the beginning of 1990s (particularly
the 1-IR index), but then returns to previous levels towards the end of the
sample. The comparison of this evidence with that found in the literature
is diﬃcult, since many studies focus on income mobility during a longer time
horizon (see for example Hungerford (1993) and those cited in Ja¨ntti and Jenk-
ins (2015)). However, Gittleman and Joyce (1999) considers similar mobility
indices for 1, 5 and 10-year windows between 1969 and 1990. The authors find
a mild reduction in mobility during the 1970s and an upwards trends until
1990. Gottschalk (1997) reports a transition matrix across quintiles of income
between 1973 and 1974 using PSID which is largely similar to my estimation
of matrix P in Equation 4.3 for those years (not shown).
While Figure 3.1 displays the probability of mobility overall, it is also inter-
esting to analyse whether these trends in mobility are shared across particular
income ranks. Figure A5 shows the evolution of 1−P 1,1 and 1−PN,N (where
P k,k is the k, k element of matrix P in Equation 4.3) for pre-tax and post-tax
distributions of income. The probability that a household moves away from
the first decile of income (Panel A) has recorded an upward trend during most
of the time horizon, only to be reverted towards the end of the sample pe-
riod. The evolution of the probability of not remaining in the top decile shows
a pattern that resembles that of the 1-IR index commented in the previous
paragraph: a downwards trend initiated after 1975 which changes direction
since the beginning of the 1990s.
3.3.2 Taxation in the US during the sample period
I use the NBER’s TAXSIM program to construct the federal tax liabilities faced
for each household in the sample. This tax simulator recreates each year’s tax
law by taking into account features of the US tax code such as the Earned In-
77
Chapter 3. The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility
Figure 3.1: Evolution of mobility indices (1967-1996)
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Note: Evolution of indices of mobility between 1967-1996. Blue line (move) is 1-IR, i.e.
the percentage of people that change income deciles after a year. Red line (trace) is the
normalised trace indicator, defined as NTI= N−trace(P )N−1 . The green line (jump) represents
the average number of income classes (e.g. deciles) than a household goes through after
a year. The yellow line (correl) is one minus the absolute correlation of income between
two adjacent years. The definition of income is Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) before taxes.
The evolution is very similar when using definitions of income after taxes or after taxes and
transfers.
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come Tax Credit (EITC), the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) or deductions
and exemption phase-outs. Since TAXSIM only computes state taxes since
1977 and due to the regressive nature of Social Security taxes (FICA), the
main empirical results in Section 3.4 make use of a longer horizon (and addi-
tional tax reforms) by exclusively considering changes in federal taxation. The
eﬀects of including state and social security taxes are explained in Section 3.5.
TAXSIM computes the eﬀective marginal tax rates by increasing taxable
income by 1$.19 For many households in the PSID sample these tax rates are
determined by the statutory tax rates associated with each income bracket.
However, the eﬀective marginal tax rate of other households will also be de-
termined by the phase-out and other features of the tax code.
Marginal tax rates from TAXSIM are calculated based on tax year, marital
status (since the sample only considers (legally) married people, I assume them
to file taxes jointly), number of dependants (including those under 17 years),
labour income from the head of the household and his spouse, asset income
(arising from rentals, dividends or interests), taxable pensions, Social Security
Income, property taxes and deductions on mortgage interests.20
Federal marginal tax rates have experienced substantial variation during
the period considered (1967-1996). Figure 3.2 (Panel A) shows the evolution
of the average marginal tax rate for each income decile in US during 1967-
1996.21 The broken line shows the average marginal tax rate for federal indi-
vidual income taxes from Barro and Redlick (2011).22 Marginal tax rates show
a marked increase during the 1970s, mainly as the result of high inflation that
19See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for an introduction to the TAXSIM program.
20Since mortgage interests are not available in the PSID for all the time horizon, I follow
Aaronson and French (2009) and assume that 80% of mortgage payments go to interest to
impute this variable.
21See Figure A6 for the evolution of the average tax rate during the same period.
22Barro and Redlick (2011) uses data from a random sample on actual tax files and
computes the average marginal tax rate with TAXSIM.
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pushed households’ income to higher tax brackets because of imperfect index-
ation of the tax schedule. This upward trend was more substantial for higher
incomes: the average marginal tax rate for those in the top decile increased
22 percentage points between 1967 and 1980 (from 26.9% up to 49%) while
the increase for the bottom three deciles ranged between 5 and 7 percentage
points. This upward trend was substantially reverted during the decade of
1980s. This was the result of major reforms such as Reagan’s Tax Reform Act
of 1986, which lowered the top statutory rate from 50% to 28% (although the
bottom tax rate increased by 4 percentage points). Some smaller tax increases
occurred during the early 1990s (e.g. a tax hike to high income earners during
Clinton’s presidency increased the marginal tax rate of the top decile from
31.3% to almost 33% in 1994).The increase of the average marginal tax rate
for the bottom decile since the end of the 1980s and even above the average
marginal tax rates of other deciles is the result of the expansion of the EITC.23
Panel B in Figure 3.2 shows the individual federal income tax rates for the
PSID households computed using the NBER calculator.24 The figure distin-
guishes between tax rates before and after the Reagan 1968 reform. The plot
shows the noticeable transformation of the tax code following the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, which substantially simplified the US tax code.
The high variation of taxes over time and across individuals depicted in
Figure 3.2 supports the identification of the causal impact of tax reforms on
income mobility.
23Note that while alterations of the EITC and other provisions have increased the average
marginal rate of the bottom deciles, the tax pressure of this group (as measured by the
average tax rate shown in Figure A6) has lowered since 1986.
24The PSID provided an estimation of the marginal tax rate on federal income during
1976-1991 based on question in the survey regarding exemptions, filling status, etc. The
correlation with my marginal tax rate computed through TAXSIM is above 90%. Butrica
and Burkhauser (1997) explore the diﬀerences between the PSID simulations and TAXSIM.
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Figure 3.2: Variation in Marginal Tax Rates (1967-1996)
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Note: Panel A shows the evolution between 1967-1996 of the average marginal tax rates for
each income decile (solid lines) calculated using TAXSIM and PSID data. The dashed line is
the economy-wise average marginal tax rate from Barro and Redlick (2011). Panel B shows
the relationship between the federal marginal rates on individual income for each household
and year in the PSID before and after the 1986 tax reform (in red and blue, respectively)
and the real Adjusted Gross Income (in 1996 dollars).
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3.3.3 The relationship between taxation and Income mo-
bility
This subsections explores the relationship between income mobility and taxa-
tion at the aggregate level. The correlation between the indices of mobility 1-IR
and NTI (described in Section 3.3.1) and the AMTR from Barro and Redlick
(2011) ranges between 35-45%. However, the evolution of the AMTR is not ex-
clusively restricted to taxes in legislation, but also the result of macroeconomic
developments (e.g. inflation increasing the taxable income of households and
pushing them to higher tax brackets).
In order to isolate changes in the US tax code from macroeconomic devel-
opments, I use the measure of legislated tax changes developed by Romer and
Romer (2010). The authors produce a narrative series of changes in federal
tax revenues (as a percentage of GDP) by documenting legislated tax changes
in the postwar US. Table A1 shows the correlation between the mobility in-
dices mentioned in Section 3.3.1 and the Romer and Romer (2010) measure
of legislated tax changes (τRomer). The relationship between tax changes and
mobility appears to be negative, albeit small. An OLS regression of the per-
centage of households changing deciles (of net income) on the narrative series
τRomer yields a slope coeﬃcient of 0.0159 (robust standard error of 0.0064),
suggesting that legislated tax changes that increase tax revenues by 1% of
GDP reduces the percentage of households changing deciles by about 1.6%.25
The correlations from Table A1 should not be given a causal interpretation.
Legislated changes in the tax code are sometimes the result of contemporane-
ous economic developments, what could result in a problem of endogeneity
25The eﬀect of τRomer on other measures of mobility as described in Section 3.3.1 ranges
between -0.0242 and -0.0073 depending on the index considered, the definition of income,
and number of income ranks (deciles or quantiles). However, some of these coeﬃcients are
estimated with high standard errors.
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when using aggregate data. In this context, the observed negative correlation
between mobility and taxes would be the result of the state of the economy,
as opposed to the disincentives produced by the tax system.
To further explore the relationship between income mobility and taxes and
the direction of causality, I consider an alternative measure to τRomer that
only includes tax changes not motivated by economic developments. Romer
and Romer (2010) produce such narrative by exploring the motivation behind
each tax change and classifying them as endogenous (motivated by economic
meanings) or exogenous (motivated by ideology or other concerns uncorrelated
to the current state of the economy). Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Mertens
(2013) further refine this series by considering only those exogenous tax changes
that aﬀect employment taxes or individual income that became eﬀective within
one year of their legislation.26
Figure 3.3 plots the relationship between some relevant indices of mobility
based on net income (1-IR, NTI and the number of income thresholds passed)
and the two narrative measures of exogenous legislated tax changes (τ exo−TOT
and τ exo−PI) described in the previous paragraph. Large tax cuts seem to
be associated with higher values of the mobility indices (more relevant when
considering the measure based on unanticipated personal income tax changes,
τ exo−PI). Correlations between these two variables range from −11% to −35%.
However, the limited number of tax changes meeting the above criteria makes
it diﬃcult to obtain conclusive results from this preliminary analysis. The
next section analyses further this question by exploiting the disaggregated
information contained in the PSID data.
26This last criterion accounts for the eﬀect of anticipation (i.e. the case where the econo-
metrician has less information than the economic agents). See Mertens and Ravn (2011)
and Mertens and Ravn (2012) for an analysis and evidence on the eﬀects of anticipation in
taxes, and Ramey (2011a) for the case of anticipation in government spending.
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between taxes (R&R, exogenous) and mobility
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Note: Relationship between indices of mobility and tax changes. Graphs in the left column
depict the correlation of mobility with the narrative measure of unanticipated exogenous
legislated tax changes (as percentage of nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010).
Graphs in the right column use a subset of the Romer and Romer series that only considers
legislated tax changes that directly aﬀect individual income tax (as a percentage of reported
income) from Mertens (2013). Mobility indices are the percentage of people changing income
deciles (first row), the normalised trace index (NTI, second row) and the average number of
income thresholds passed by a household between two adjacent years.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Estimation Strategy
The objective of this section is to quantify the eﬀect of taxation on income
mobility. To estimate this eﬀect I regress the marginal tax rate on measures of
mobility that vary on the definition of income and the number of ranks used
to divide the income distribution. I estimate the following regression:
mobilityi,t = A+Bi +Bt + βτi,t + γXi,t + εi,t (3.3)
where mobilityi,t ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable that takes value 1 when a house-
hold changes to a diﬀerent income rank between periods t − 1 and t. Bi
represents individual fixed eﬀects that are assumed to remain constant over
time. Bt represents time fixed eﬀects which can have an influence on the de-
pendent variable at the aggregate level (e.g. a macroeconomic shock aﬀecting
income mobility). τi,t is the marginal tax rate of individual i in time t com-
puted using TAXSIM as explained in Section 3.3. Individual-specific shocks
to income mobility in period t are denoted by εi,t.
The impact of taxes on income mobility can be aﬀected by diﬀerent factors.
Life-cycle considerations are important since the decisions that determine in-
come mobility (labour income or asset income) can be diﬀerent for younger
or older households. Preferences towards leisure can also vary over time, de-
pending on the family composition.27 Additionally, health-related factors can
potentially aﬀect labour income and therefore, mobility.28 To account for all
27Labour supplied by the spouse is an important factor to take into account in this
analysis since married female workers have a more disperse distribution of hours worked and
are, therefore, more likely to be able to adjust their workload. See Blundell et al. (1998) for
an investigation on the eﬀects of tax reforms on female labour supply.
28See French (2005) for an investigation on how health aﬀects labour supply and retire-
ment decisions.
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these factors, vector Xi,t in equation 3.3 includes the age of the head and wife,
the size of family, number of children below 18 in the household, a dummy for
a working spouse and a dummy for the health status of the head as control
variables.
I will consider specifications where the dependent variablemobilityi,t diﬀers
in how income is measured: income before federal taxes, income after federal
taxes but before transfers, and income after taxes and transfers.29 In this way,
we will be able to distinguish whether the potential impact of taxes on income
mobility is restricted to the redistributive eﬀect of the tax and transfer system
or has a more fundamental reason such as aﬀecting the labour supply choices
(as described in Section 3.2). I will also consider specifications where the
dependent variable mobilityi,t diﬀers on how ranks of the income distribution
are defined, distinguishing between deciles and quintiles in order to further
support the robustness of the results.
3.4.2 Results from OLS regressions
Table 3.1 shows the results of estimating Equation 3.3 using OLS. The eﬀect
of the marginal rate on the probability that the household moves to a diﬀerent
decile of pre-tax income is negative and highly significant: the point estimate
is −0.383 (standard error of 0.06).30 The results are robust to the inclusion of
control variables regarding life-cycle, demographics, spouse labour supply or
health status.
29Transfers include both non-taxable public income (e.g. Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) benefits) and income transferred from other sources (e.g. relative). During the period
considered, the PSID does not oﬀer exact information on public transfers alone (SSI is
reported, but others are not) with yearly frequency. However, the percentage of non-public
income in the transfers variable considered here was only about 0.4% in 1980, on average.
30Throughout this chapter, models that estimate a binary outcome report estimates that
can be interpreted as percentage changes in probability. For example, an estimate of -0.383
represents a -0.383% reduction of success of the dependent variable.
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Table 3.1: OLS estimation (with diﬀerent controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
τt -0.383∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
age (H) -0.578∗ -0.618∗∗ -0.620∗∗ -0.622∗∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
age (W) 0.136 0.134 0.134 0.132
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
family size -0.511 -0.533 -0.535
(0.66) (0.65) (0.65)
num children -0.308 -0.268 -0.264
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65)
working wife 0.972 0.972
(0.85) (0.85)
health status 1.084
(1.26)
N 50769 50748 50748 50748 50748
Note: OLS estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to
a diﬀerent decile of post-tax income. Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel
data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
87
Chapter 3. The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility
Table 3.2 explores the eﬀects of taxation on alternative measures of income
and income ranks. Columns 1-3 report the impact on the probability of chang-
ing deciles of income before taxes and transfers, income after taxes and before
transfers, and income after taxes and transfers, respectively. Columns 4-6 use
the same measures of income but consider instead the eﬀects on the probabil-
ity of changing quintiles of income. The estimated coeﬃcient of the marginal
tax rate is significant above the 99% level for all six specifications. The size
of the eﬀect is about -0.40/-0.35 for most regressions, with the specification
that considers changes in quantiles of post-transfer income reporting a slightly
smaller estimate (-0.285). Overall, these result suggest that there is negative
relationship between taxes and income mobility.
3.4.3 Results from IV regressions
The US tax code is progressive and the marginal tax rate depends therefore on
income. This causes τi,t in Equation 3.3 to be endogenous: when a shock εi,t
aﬀects income positively, the household will be pushed to a higher tax bracket,
and rendering the OLS estimation of Equation 3.3 biased. In principle, the
direction of the endogeneity bias is not clear since it depends on how a shock
to εi,t aﬀects τi,t. Consider the case of a positive individual shock (e.g. a
time varying preference shock) that raises income and, as result of it, mobility.
Since the individual will face a higher tax bracket, the relationship between the
shock and τi,t is positive, making the OLS upward biased. In the opposite case,
a shock that decreases income (but still increases mobility) reduces the tax
bracket, inducing a downward bias in the OLS estimations. If we consider that
positive shocks to εi,t are more likely to drive income up (because households
have more margin to increase hours worked and income in the face of positive
preference shocks as opposed to shocks that make them willing to cut hours
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Table 3.2: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
τt -0.399∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
age (H) -0.672∗∗ -0.622∗∗ -0.257 -0.930∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗ -0.473
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.37)
age (W) 0.110 0.132 -0.169 0.503∗ 0.322 0.130
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.36)
family size -0.316 -0.535 -0.826 -0.173 -0.638 -0.617
(0.68) (0.65) (0.65) (0.63) (0.65) (0.66)
num children -0.163 -0.264 0.008 -0.589 -0.186 -0.134
(0.68) (0.65) (0.66) (0.63) (0.64) (0.67)
working wife 0.951 0.972 0.542 -0.242 0.187 -0.822
(0.83) (0.85) (0.91) (0.83) (0.84) (0.94)
health status 0.575 1.084 0.340 -1.599 -0.093 -2.843∗∗
(1.23) (1.26) (1.32) (1.28) (1.28) (1.27)
N 50748 50748 47890 50748 50748 47890
Note: OLS estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to
a diﬀerent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Specifications also diﬀer on how income
is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span
is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗
pvalue p < 0.01.
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and income), then the first eﬀect dominates, and the correlation between εi,t
and τi,t is positive, making the OLS estimates biased towards positive values.
To address this problem of endogeneity, I construct an instrument that
isolates the variation in τi,t that is only due to changes in the tax reforms.31
The instrument is defined as:
∆τ t−1i,t = τ
t
i,t − τ t−1i,t (3.4)
where τ ti,t is the actual tax rate faced by household i, with income earned in
time t and employing the tax code for fiscal year t. τ t−1i,t is the counterfactual
tax rate that a household i with current income from time t would have faced
had the tax schedule from time t − 1 remained present. Both the actual
and the counterfactual tax rates are computed using TAXSIM as described in
Section 3.3. When ∆τ t−1i,t is positive, a household faces a higher tax pressure
as a result of a fiscal reform. Conversely, negative values of ∆τ t−1i,t indicates
that tax reforms relevant for household i have resulted in lower tax pressure.
Panel A of Figure 3.4 shows the average of ∆τ t−1i,t for each income decile.
The figure illustrates the extent to which new tax legislation has aﬀected federal
income liabilities. As mentioned in Section 3.3, the US has experienced several
tax reforms during 1967-1996. These reforms feature prominently in Figure
3.4, showing significant variation over time and across income deciles. These
are the cases of, for example the generalised decrease in statutory tax rates
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, or the increase in the rate schedule of high
income households as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993. Panel B of Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of people in the sample
that are aﬀected by tax reforms (i.e. those with ∆τ t−1i,t ̸= 0). The figure
31This strategy has been also employed in the income elasticity literature: see Gruber
and Saez (2002) for an example and Saez et al. (2012) for a review of this literature and its
identification approaches.
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shows that while some reforms aﬀected most of households (the case of tax
legislation during 1980-1989), some tax legislations only targeted low income
earners (between 1974-1978), while others were focused on richer households
(the case of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993).32
Table 4.3 shows the results of estimating Equation 3.3 using tax reforms
as an instrument for the marginal tax rate.33 The estimated coeﬃcients of the
marginal tax rates are almost double the size compared to the OLS estimators,
suggesting that the latter suﬀer from an upward bias. The probability of
changing to a diﬀerent decile of income when the tax rate goes up by one
percentage point is estimated to be reduced by about 0.8 percentage points
(columns 1-3 in Table 4.3): -0.813 when using a pre-tax measure of income or
-0.769 when considering income after federal taxes, with a standard error of
0.23.
The eﬀect of taxes on mobility when using a distribution of income ordered
in quintiles is also negative, although slightly smaller in magnitude (but bigger
in absolute value than the equivalent OLS estimates). The probability that
households’ income remains in the same quintile after an increase of one per-
centage point in the marginal tax rate is estimated to be around 0.5% (columns
4-6 in Table 4.3), significant at levels of confidence of 95%.
To understand the magnitude of this eﬀect, consider a reduction in the
marginal rate of 7 percentage points, which is slightly smaller than the standard
deviation of non-zero changes in the actual tax rate τi,t. The probability that
a household moves to a diﬀerent decile in the income distribution increases by
32A systematic correlation between income and changes in tax legislation would threat
the validity of ∆τ t−1i,t as an exogenous instrument. Including a long panel where tax reforms
are the result of diﬀerent ideological positions mitigates this problem. Section 3.5 checks
the robustness of the results to including lag income (see Gruber and Saez (2002) for a
discussion).
33The F-statistic from the first-stage regressions shows a a very high value above 1500 for
all the specifications, indicating that the instrument is relevant. Some specifications reduce
considerably this value, although it always remains well above 10.
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Figure 3.4: The evolution of tax reforms (1967-1996)
PANEL A: Variations in the tax rate due to legislated tax changes
PANEL B: Percentage of households aﬀected by tax reforms
Note: Panel A shows the evolution between 1967 and 1996 of the instrument ∆τ t−1i,t =
τ ti,t − τ t−1i,t (diﬀerence between the actual marginal tax rate and a counterfactual marginal
tax rate computed using TAXSIM). Grey bars represent the narrative measure of legislated
tax changes (as percentage of nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010). These are
classified as endogenous tax changes (related to the current state of the economy, in light
grey) and exogenous tax changes (unrelated to the state of economy, in dark grey). Panel B
shows the (weighted) percentage of people for each decile of income that experience a change
in their marginal tax rate in a given year, i.e. ∆τ t−1i,t ̸= 0.
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about 5.4-5.7% (depending on the definition of income). Or, in other words, a
7 percentage point cut in the marginal rate makes the household about 5.5%
less likely to remain in the same income decile. This represents a tenth of the
average likelihood of moving to a diﬀerent income decile within one year.34
The magnitudes are remarkably similar when considering movements across
quintiles of income. A 7 percentage point decrease in the marginal rate results
in households being around 3.5% more likely to move to a diﬀerent income
quintile. As before, this also represents a tenth of the average probability of
movement in the income quintile distribution over the course of a year.
3.4.4 Average and marginal tax rates
Tax reforms can impact on eﬀective marginal rates directly through changes in
the statutory tax rates or by introducing provisions that aﬀect deductions, tax
credits or coverage. Therefore, while some changes in the US tax code have
an eﬀect through the marginal tax rates, others reduce the tax liabilities and
aﬀect the average tax rate.
In this subsection I try to isolate the eﬀects of changes in marginal tax rates
τi,t and average marginal tax rates τ¯i,t, by exploiting variation over time and
across individuals in average and marginal tax rates. I estimate a version of
Equation 3.3 that includes the average tax rate τ¯i,t.35 I construct an instrument
in the same fashion as in Equation 3.4: I compute the diﬀerence between the
actual average tax rate in time t and a counterfactual average tax rate based
on income obtained in time t taxed using the code of year t − 1. Figure A7
34The average probability of changing deciles between two years is 55% for the pre-tax and
post-tax definitions of income, and 57% for income post-transfers. The average likelihood of
changing quintiles of income is smaller: 35% for pre-tax and post-tax income and 36% for
post-transfer income.
35Average tax rates are constructed by dividing federal income liabilities by income.
Figure A6 plot the evolution of these tax rates in the US between 1967 and 1996, averaged
across income deciles.
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Table 3.3: IV estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
τi,t -0.813∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗ -0.478∗∗ -0.506∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
age (H) -0.582∗∗ -0.542∗∗ 4.481∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ 2.560
(0.27) (0.27) (1.87) (0.26) (0.27) (1.76)
age (W) 0.078 0.104 -0.198 0.490∗ 0.317 0.114
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
family size -0.206 -0.437 -0.695 -0.130 -0.619 -0.548
(0.60) (0.61) (0.64) (0.58) (0.58) (0.62)
num children -0.418 -0.490 -0.261 -0.688 -0.230 -0.274
(0.61) (0.62) (0.65) (0.59) (0.59) (0.62)
working wife 1.927∗∗ 1.839∗ 1.549 0.140 0.355 -0.297
(0.96) (0.97) (0.99) (0.95) (0.95) (0.98)
health status 0.250 0.794 0.028 -1.727 -0.149 -3.006∗∗
(1.25) (1.26) (1.32) (1.22) (1.23) (1.28)
1st stage F-stat 1577 1577 1602 1577 1577 1602
N 50745 50745 47791 50745 50745 47791
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
to a diﬀerent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for
the marginal tax rate τ . Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI,
post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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shows the evolution in time and across income deciles of this new instrument.
Table 3.4 displays the results of estimating the impact of marginal tax rates
and average tax rates on diﬀerent income mobility variables. The inclusion of
the average tax rate and the use of the new instrument mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraph, increase the estimated coeﬃcients on the marginal tax rate.
The eﬀect of a percentage point reduction in marginal tax rates fosters rela-
tive income mobility across deciles (of pre-tax and post-tax income, columns
1 and 2 in Table 3.4) by about 1% (with a standard errors of 0.18). Similarly,
households are about 6% more likely to stay in the same quintile of income
when the marginal tax rates goes up by one percentage point (columns 4-6 in
Table 3.4).
While the coeﬃcient on marginal tax rate is significant at confidence levels
above 99% across all specifications, that of the average marginal tax rate is
not. The reported coeﬃcients are high and negative,36 but none of them are
significant at usual significance levels. Therefore, when both marginal and
average tax rates are accounted for, only the former has a significant (and
negative) eﬀect on the relative mobility.
This evidence suggests that the economic mechanism that determines the
eﬀect of taxes on income mobility is based on incentives (the substitution of
leisure by labour as shown in Section 3.2) as opposed to the wealth eﬀects
originated by a reduction in available income. This view is consistent with
Barro and Redlick (2011) and Mertens (2013), who use time series evidence to
analyse the impact of tax reforms. This finding has important implications for
the design of fiscal policy since reforms that provide more incentives to work
are more likely to foster income mobility as opposed to those that only reduce
36With the exception of the specification in column 3 (using deciles of post-transfers
income), where the estimated coeﬃcient is close to zero but slightly positive.
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tax pressure without aﬀecting the marginal tax rate.37
3.5 Robustness
This section checks the robustness of previous results along several dimen-
sions. Particularly, I depart from the benchmark estimations by considering
alternative definitions of distribution of income, adding further controls the re-
gressions, including state and payroll taxes, checking the stability of the results
to samples that diﬀer in time horizon and selection criteria, employing and al-
ternative measure to asses mobility and considering specification with diﬀerent
lags of the explanatory variables. The results from this section contribute to
support the evidence of the negative eﬀect of taxes on income mobility.
Alternative definitions of income. The results in Section 3.4 are based
on measures of income defined as Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) before taxes,
after taxes but before transfers and after taxes and transfers. Tables 3.5 and 3.6
report IV estimates of Equation 3.3 using alternative definitions of income to
determine the probability of moving to diﬀerent ranks. Columns 1 and 2 in
Table 3.5 report the estimated eﬀect of marginal tax rates on mobility across
deciles of pre-taxes and post-taxes of joint taxable income of head and wife.
The coeﬃcients are slightly higher than those in Table 4.3, with IV estimates
close to -1 (and standard errors slightly above 0.2) and highly significant.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5 display the eﬀects on income mobility based
on labour income of the head and wife. The point estimation when using pre-
tax income is slightly below -1 (-1.06, with standard error of 0.24) while it
37As an additional exercise to further support this claim, one could consider episodes of
tax reforms that did not aﬀect marginal tax rates but reduced tax liabilities. These episodes
are however very scarce and usually much smaller in size, therefore I do not pursue this
avenue.
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Table 3.4: IV Estimation with average tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
τt -1.028∗∗∗ -0.993∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -0.590∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
τ¯t -4.037 -4.209 0.092 -1.391 -2.798 -1.167
(3.71) (3.77) (3.50) (2.98) (3.16) (3.35)
age (H) -0.077 -0.016 4.462∗∗ -0.721∗ -0.358 2.801
(0.51) (0.52) (2.00) (0.42) (0.45) (1.89)
age (W) -0.151 -0.135 -0.194 0.411 0.158 0.055
(0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)
family size 0.465 0.263 -0.710 0.102 -0.154 -0.353
(0.84) (0.85) (0.83) (0.73) (0.76) (0.79)
num children -4.534 -4.781 -0.170 -2.107 -3.083 -1.430
(3.73) (3.79) (3.42) (2.98) (3.16) (3.27)
working wife 10.105 10.365 1.365 2.959 6.022 2.048
(7.19) (7.30) (6.67) (5.67) (6.04) (6.37)
health status -1.860 -1.404 0.074 -2.454 -1.611 -3.589∗
(2.22) (2.24) (2.08) (1.86) (1.95) (2.00)
1st stage F-stat 944 944 949 944 944 949
N 50745 50745 47791 50745 50745 47791
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal and average tax rates on the probability
of moving to a diﬀerent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as
instruments for the marginal tax rate τt and the average tax rate τ¯t. Specifications also
diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI and post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-
transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and
individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1,
∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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is somewhat smaller when considering post-tax income (-0.74, with standard
error of 0.24). Both estimates are significant at confidence levels of 99%.38
Column 5 of Table 3.5 report the results when only asset income of the
head and wife is used to determine income mobility. The point estimate is, as
expected, smaller (−0.402) but significant at levels of 90%. Column 6 considers
a broader definition of income that includes other sources of income from other
people living in the family.39 The point estimation is also smaller (-0.472) but
significant as well.
Table 3.6 reports the same specifications using the alternative measures
of income, but determining mobility in terms of quintiles of income. Results
using the taxable income and labour income of head and wife (columns 1-4)
are highly significant at levels of 99%. The magnitude of the eﬀects when
considering taxable income is about -0.63 and 0.72 (for post-tax and pre-tax
income respectively, with standard errors of 0.23), and higher when consid-
ering labour income (-1.03 for pre-tax income and -0.88 for post-tax income,
with same standard errors). The estimated coeﬃcients when considering asset
income or (adjusted) family income (columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.6 respectively)
are negative but small and not significant.
Further controls. The benchmark estimates control for a number of life cy-
cle and demographic factors. Section 3.2 pointed out that accumulated wealth
could reduce mobility since households with higher asset income are less likely
to move down the income distribution when labour income is lower. Since
information on wealth is not measured frequently in the PSID during the pe-
38Interestingly, the estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variable for working wife in the
household become larger and more significant than in other specifications.
39This measure of income is divided by the square root of the number of people living in
the family to adjust it for family size. See Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015).
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Table 3.5: Robustness to alternative definitions of income (deciles)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tax inc.
(pre-tax)
tax inc.
(post-tax)
labour inc.
(pre-tax)
labour inc.
(post-tax)
asset inc.
(pre-tax)
fam. inc.
(pre-tax)
τi,tt -0.979∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗ -0.402∗ -0.473∗∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
age (H) -0.775∗∗∗ -0.418 -0.684∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗ -0.692∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
age (W) 0.298 -0.013 0.170 0.243 0.475∗ -0.128
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
family size -0.756 -0.572 -0.304 -0.091 3.891∗∗∗ 0.560
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.62) (0.61) (0.59)
num children -0.528 -0.492 -0.991 -1.397∗∗ -5.090∗∗∗ -1.752∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.60)
working wife 2.271∗∗ 2.350∗∗ 3.857∗∗∗ 2.944∗∗∗ 0.813 1.158
(0.96) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.93)
health stastus 1.678 0.865 0.767 0.644 3.081∗∗ -0.324
(1.25) (1.27) (1.26) (1.27) (1.28) (1.23)
1st stage F-stat 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577
N 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to
a diﬀerent decile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate
τ . Specifications diﬀer in how income is defined: columns 1-2 refer to taxable income of head
and wife, columns 3-4 refer to labour income of head and wife, column 5 refers to asset income
of head and wife, and column 6 refers to adjusted family income (the adjustment consists
on dividing family income by the square root of family size). Specifications also diﬀer on
how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI).
Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual
fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6: Robustness to alternative definitions of income (quintiles)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tax inc.
(pre-tax)
tax inc.
(post-tax)
labour inc.
(pre-tax)
labour inc.
(post-tax)
asset inc.
(pre-tax)
fam. inc.
(pre-tax)
τt -0.722∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗ -1.027∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗ -0.115 -0.288
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
age (H) -0.739∗∗∗ -0.675∗∗ -0.379 -0.534∗∗ -0.498∗ 1.092∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
age (W) 0.358 0.311 -0.057 0.080 0.315 -0.017
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23)
family size -0.520 -0.856 -1.007∗ -0.274 3.798∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.61) (0.55)
num children -0.640 -0.072 -0.260 -0.983∗ -5.079∗∗∗ -0.761
(0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.61) (0.56)
working wife 0.762 0.948 2.991∗∗∗ 2.589∗∗∗ -1.385 -0.228
(0.95) (0.95) (0.94) (0.95) (0.95) (0.87)
health status -0.476 -0.840 0.317 -0.459 1.796 -0.064
(1.22) (1.22) (1.22) (1.22) (1.24) (1.15)
1st stage F-stat 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577
N 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to
a diﬀerent quintile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate
τ . Specifications diﬀer in how income is defined: columns 1-2 refer to taxable income of head
and wife, columns 3-4 refer to labour income of head and wife, column 5 refers to asset income
of head and wife, and column 6 refers to adjusted family income (the adjustment consists
on dividing family income by the square root of family size). Specifications also diﬀer on
how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI).
Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual
fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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riod considered,40 I use net home equity (self-reported house value minus the
remaining mortgage on the house) to proxy for net worth.41 Columns 1-3 in
Table 3.7 report the IV estimates of the marginal tax rate on income mobility
when including wealth as a control. The coeﬃcient of this variable (measured
in thousands of 1996 dollars) is negative as expected: an increase of 100,000 in
house equity increases the probability of staying in the same income decile by
about 5%. The estimated coeﬃcient of the marginal tax rate is close to -0.8
for all three specifications considered (which vary in how income is measured)
and remains highly significant (at levels of 99%).
Next, I consider dummy variables of the position in the income distribution
in year t− 1 as controls. This aims to take into account two potential issues.
First, the previous position in the income distribution can be informative of
the likelihood of moving to other income rank. And second, related to the
previous point, people positioned in the first or last income rank (e.g. the 1st
and 10th decile) are, by definition, less likely to move (since their movements
are restricted to one direction). Columns 4-6 of in Table 3.7 shows the results
of including these new controls. The new variables have large and positive
estimated coeﬃcients,42 which seem to suggest that households with income
belonging to the central part of the distribution (deciles 4-7) are more likely
to experience movements along the income ranks. Regarding the estimated
coeﬃcients on the marginal tax rates, controlling for the previous position
in the income distribution reduces the impact of marginal tax rates slightly
(by about 0.1 percentage points), but the coeﬃcients remain significant at
40PSID data only includes snapshots of wealth for years 1984, 1989 and 1994, and from
1999 onwards.
41Information on household equity is included yearly in the PSID, with the exception of
years 1973 and 1974. Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) reports that net home equity represents
60% of the average homeowner wealth (64% for the median homeowner).
42This specification highlights a common problem with linear probability models: the
sum of the estimated coeﬃcients can be in excess of 100, which is not conceptually possible.
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confidence levels of 99%.
As discussed in Section 3.4, a systematic relation between the instrument
∆τ t−1i,t and previous income levels can lead to biased estimations if the error
term εi,t in Equation 3.3 also depends on previous income. To address this
issue, columns 1-3 in Table 3.8 report the eﬀect of marginal tax rates on the
probability of income mobility when controlling for previous income (measured
by AGI). The inclusion of the variable supports the validity of the instrument
while also controls for non-labour income (e.g. asset income). The estimated
coeﬃcients are not noticeably changed with respect to the main results (see
Table 4.3), and remain in the region of -0.8 (standard errors of 0.22) and
statistically significant at levels of confidence of 99%.
Lastly, columns 4-6 in Table 3.8 include absolute changes in income (AGI)
as an additional control. By definition of the mobility variables (which capture
the probability that income in period t belongs to a diﬀerent income rank than
that of period t − 1), this variable explain most of the likelihood of relative
income movements. The inclusion of this variable strengthens the eﬀect of
marginal tax rate on income mobility by about 0.2 percentage points: the
estimated coeﬃcients become close to -1 (with standard errors of 0.22), while
remaining significant.
State and Payroll tax rates. So far, only federal income tax liabilities have
been considered in the analysis. However, the total eﬀective tax pressure in
the US also includes payroll tax liabilities (FICA) and state-level tax liabilities.
Payroll taxes are charged at the federal level to both employees and employers
in order to fund social benefits programs (Social Security and Medicare). The
FICA marginal tax rate has been relatively low until 1979 with substantially
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Table 3.7: Robustness to further controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
τt -0.828∗∗∗ -0.789∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
age (H) -0.461 -0.436 4.533∗∗ -0.444∗ -0.403 4.512∗∗
(0.28) (0.28) (1.89) (0.26) (0.27) (1.85)
age (W) 0.114 0.178 -0.099 -0.022 0.002 -0.320
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)
family size 0.018 -0.314 -0.578 -0.305 -0.543 -0.819
(0.64) (0.64) (0.68) (0.60) (0.60) (0.63)
num children -0.530 -0.473 -0.115 -0.365 -0.435 -0.207
(0.64) (0.65) (0.69) (0.61) (0.61) (0.64)
working wife 1.964∗∗ 2.315∗∗ 1.633 1.612∗ 1.506 1.131
(0.99) (0.99) (1.02) (0.93) (0.94) (0.96)
health status 0.290 1.232 0.468 0.116 0.660 -0.071
(1.29) (1.29) (1.36) (1.24) (1.25) (1.31)
wealth -0.045∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
decilet−1 = 2 13.310∗∗∗ 13.321∗∗∗ 13.297∗∗∗
(1.39) (1.38) (1.40)
decilet−1 = 3 18.715∗∗∗ 18.945∗∗∗ 17.955∗∗∗
(1.42) (1.42) (1.45)
decilet−1 = 4 22.120∗∗∗ 22.462∗∗∗ 22.363∗∗∗
(1.38) (1.38) (1.42)
decilet−1 = 9 11.684∗∗∗ 11.852∗∗∗ 12.171∗∗∗
(1.40) (1.39) (1.44)
1st stage F-stat 1570 1570 1597 1567 1567 1596
N 47508 47508 44547 50745 50745 47791
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
to a diﬀerent decile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax
rate τt. Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI
and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Variable wealth is measured in thousands of 1996
dollars. decilet−1 = k is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the income decile in the previous
period was k. Rows for deciles 5 to 8 are omitted in the interest of space (all coeﬃcients
are significant) Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and
individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1,
∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Robustness to income controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
τt -0.800∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -1.053∗∗∗ -1.009∗∗∗ -0.983∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
age (H) -0.714∗∗ -0.615∗∗ 4.466∗∗ -0.437∗ -0.397 3.568∗∗
(0.28) (0.28) (1.88) (0.25) (0.25) (1.75)
age (W) 0.089 0.110 -0.195 0.039 0.065 -0.208
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26)
family size -0.253 -0.464 -0.712 0.046 -0.184 -0.441
(0.60) (0.61) (0.63) (0.57) (0.58) (0.62)
num children -0.402 -0.481 -0.255 -0.413 -0.486 -0.274
(0.61) (0.62) (0.65) (0.58) (0.59) (0.63)
working wife 1.771∗∗ 1.753∗ 1.500 2.940∗∗∗ 2.855∗∗∗ 2.410∗∗
(0.90) (0.90) (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) (0.94)
health status 0.321 0.834 0.048 -1.114 -0.573 -1.079
(1.24) (1.25) (1.32) (1.18) (1.19) (1.27)
log incomet−1 1.649 0.906 0.552
(1.66) (1.68) (1.69)
abs (∆incomet) 94.612∗∗∗ 94.837∗∗∗ 87.523∗∗∗
(2.22) (2.22) (2.00)
1st stage F-stat 1791 1791 1802 1581 1581 1605
N 50741 50741 47788 50736 50736 47783
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
to a diﬀerent decile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal
tax rate τt. Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax
AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Additional controls account for lagged income
and absolute income changes, where income is measured as household’s AGI. Time span
is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗
pvalue p < 0.01.
104
Chapter 3. The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility
less variation than federal income taxes.43 On the other hand, TAXSIM can
only compute marginal tax rates at the state level from 1977.
To check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of payroll and state
tax liabilities, I compute the marginal and average tax rate on total tax lia-
bilities (federal income, FICA and sate) from 1978 to 1996 using TAXSIM.44
The number of available observations in the PSID sample is reduced by about
a third, down to about 35,400. Table 3.9 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of
the marginal tax rate on the probability of changing deciles (columns 1-3)
and quintiles (columns 4-6) of income. The estimated coeﬃcients are lower by
about 0.25 percentage points when compared to those in Table 4.3, but still
significant across all specifications considered at confidence levels of at least
90%. When considering pretax income, household are 0.565% (standard er-
ror of 0.20) less likely to move to a diﬀerent income decile when the marginal
tax rate goes up by one percentage point. Specifications considering transi-
tion across income quantiles report estimated coeﬃcients ranging from -0.38
to -0.33 (with standard errors of 0.19 and 0.20).
Sample stability. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a substantial impact
on the US tax code in many diﬀerent dimensions (e.g. significant cuts in
statutory tax rates, elimination of several provisions). To account for potential
sample instability in the estimations due to this major reform, Table 3.10
reports the coeﬃcients of marginal tax rates and average tax rates on the
probability of moving to a diﬀerent decile of income considering a sample before
1986 (columns 1-3) and from 1986 onwards (columns 4-6). The diﬀerences in
43FICA marginal tax rate has averaged 0.03% between 1967 and 1978. Its standard
deviation between 1967-1996 is half of the federal income tax rates, and about a third of it
during 1967-1997. See Barro and Redlick (2011).
44Figure A8 plots the variation across individuals in total marginal tax rates during this
period.
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Table 3.9: IV Estimation with State and Payroll Tax rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
τt -0.565∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.334∗ -0.379∗ -0.356∗ -0.335∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
τ¯t 1.820 5.246 1.777 0.519 3.168 1.137
(4.19) (5.03) (4.28) (3.87) (4.32) (3.96)
age (H) 0.079 -0.323 -0.313 -0.521 -0.097 -0.240
(0.43) (0.49) (0.44) (0.41) (0.45) (0.41)
age (W) -0.678 -0.317 -0.101 0.263 -0.324 0.018
(0.42) (0.48) (0.43) (0.40) (0.45) (0.40)
family size -1.385 -1.997 -2.023 -0.726 -1.341 -0.940
(1.34) (1.53) (1.35) (1.25) (1.36) (1.27)
num children 2.093 5.196 2.366 0.563 3.253 1.261
(5.06) (6.03) (5.15) (4.69) (5.20) (4.77)
working wife -3.635 -11.042 -4.178 -1.522 -8.103 -3.984
(10.10) (11.99) (10.29) (9.37) (10.37) (9.57)
health status 2.007 3.240 2.657 -1.541 1.737 -0.342
(2.56) (2.91) (2.58) (2.41) (2.61) (2.45)
1st stage F-stat 1416 1416 1412 1416 1416 1412
N 35408 35408 35374 35408 35408 35374
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
to a diﬀerent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Taxes include federal income, payroll and
state liabilities. Tax reforms are used as instruments for the marginal tax rate τt and the
average tax rate τ¯t. Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI and
post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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the coeﬃcients before and after are not statistically diﬀerent from each other
(probably because of the higher standard errors resulting from lower sample
size). For example, the estimated coeﬃcient of the marginal tax rate is -
0.835 (standard error of 0.41) considering pre-tax income before 1986, and
-1.018 (standard error of 0.26) after 1986. All the estimated coeﬃcients are
statistically significantly diﬀerent from 0 at confidence levels of 99%.
The estimated coeﬃcients do however show diﬀerences between before and
after 1986. While the coeﬃcients are always negative, they are not signifi-
cant after 1986 (in line with the results from Table 3.4) and significant across
some specifications (using pre-tax and post-tax income) before 1986.This could
suggest that the eﬀect of average tax rates diminishes when taxes and, most
noticeably, transfers are introduced (before 1986). However, a counterfactual
analysis of tax reforms would be required to add support to this interpretation.
Sample selection. The PSID sample selected for this chapter responds to
the goal of targeting households that are actively involved in the labour market.
I now check whether the results presented in Section 3.4 are robust to diﬀerent
sample specifications.
As described in Section 3.3, PSID includes two subsamples: a representative
sample of the US (core or SRC sample) and a sub-sample that over-represents
low-income (the Survey of Economic Opportunity, SEO, a project from which
PSID was originated). To insure representability, the PSID provides weights
to account for diﬀerent sampling probabilities and attrition. Columns 1 and 2
of Table 3.11 presents results when only the core sample (and no weights) are
used. This represents a reduction of almost 40% in the sample size. However,
the estimated eﬀect of marginal tax rates on the probability of changing income
deciles is still negative and highly significant at 99%: point estimates of -0.95
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Table 3.10: IV Estimation Sample Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pre 1986
pre-tax
pre 1986
post-tax
pre 1986
post-trans
post 1986
pre-tax
post 1986
post-tax
post 1986
post-trans
τt -0.835∗∗ -0.971∗∗∗ -0.847∗∗ -1.018∗∗∗ -0.837∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.37) (0.35) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
τ¯t -5.145∗∗∗ -2.908∗ -1.476 -0.959 -0.068 -0.867
(1.76) (1.64) (1.53) (1.91) (1.92) (1.91)
age (H) 1.229∗ 0.628 0.003 0.322 -1.073 -0.858
(0.69) (0.64) (2.08) (0.90) (0.94) (0.95)
age (W) -0.164 -0.005 -0.182 -0.745 0.760 0.837
(0.43) (0.42) (0.45) (0.89) (0.92) (0.94)
family size -0.802 -0.340 -0.740 -1.094 -1.274 -1.062
(0.81) (0.80) (0.85) (1.37) (1.38) (1.35)
num children -5.072∗∗∗ -3.300∗ -1.710 -0.147 0.222 -0.342
(1.86) (1.73) (1.58) (2.40) (2.41) (2.38)
working wife 9.666∗∗∗ 5.382∗ 3.978 3.410 1.902 0.441
(3.11) (2.84) (2.59) (4.62) (4.66) (4.64)
health status -2.792 -0.544 -2.121 -1.544 1.754 1.853
(1.97) (1.91) (1.98) (2.41) (2.34) (2.41)
1st st. F-stat 157 157 158 813 813 810
N 29069 29069 26144 19356 19356 19321
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal and average tax rates on the probability
of moving to a diﬀerent decile of income before and after (including) 1986. Tax reforms are
used as instruments for the marginal tax rate τt and the average tax rate τ¯t. Specifications
also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI and post-tax AGI and post-tax and
post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include
time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue
p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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and -0.72 (standard errors of 0.25) when considering pre-tax and post-tax
income respectively.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.11 display the estimations based on a sample
that additionally includes households with a head younger than 25 or older
than 60 years.45 The estimated coeﬃcients of the marginal tax rates are smaller
(but still significant at confidence levels of 90%), suggesting that the income
mobility of very young or old households is not as much determined by changes
in taxation compared to households with a head aged 25-60.
Next, I consider whether the benchmark sample criteria may induce a bias
due to households being self selected into groups. These would be the case
if higher taxes aﬀect the decision of work at the extensive margin (a head
of household decides to become unemployed when taxes go up) or to become
self-employed.46 To address this, columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.11 report the esti-
mates when the sample is extended to include households with a self-employed
status. The point estimates of the eﬀect of marginal tax rates remain similar
(and highly significant) to the benchmark estimations: -0.88 (standard error of
0.20) and -0.84 (standard error of 0.21) when considering pre-tax and post-tax
income, respectively.
Alternatively, columns 5 and 6 display the estimates when the sample also
includes households whose head is unemployed.47 Marginal tax rates are esti-
mated to reduce income mobility by 0.72 and 0.74% (for pre-tax and post-tax
income, respectively; standard errors of 0.22). These coeﬃcients are statisti-
cally significant at confidence levels of 99%.
Lastly, I extend the sample to include families whose head is a female.48
45These thresholds are often considered to determine the prime age for labour market
engagement. See for example Keane (2011).
46The potential eﬀect of taxes on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is further
discussed in Section 3.7.
47A dummy for heads who are employed is added to these specifications.
48PSID usually assigns the role of the head of the household to a male when he is present.
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Columns 9 and 11 show the estimates when considering this enlarged sample
(these include a dummy variable for male heads). The estimated coeﬃcients
are quantitatively similar to the benchmark results, and marginal taxes are
found to increase the probability of households remaining in the same pre-tax
income decile by about 0.6% (0.8% for post-tax income, standard errors of 0.23
and 0.24, respectively).
Alternative dependent variable. The dependent variable mobilityi,t used
in the main results exploits the information in the diagonal of the probability
matrix P in Equation 4.3: it computes the probability that a household with
income belonging to rank k in period t − 1 remains in the same position in
time t. An alternative way to measure mobility is to calculate the number of
income ranks that a household crosses when moving in the income distribution.
For example, this new variable, jumpi,t, takes value of 3 if a household moves
in the income distribution from income decile k in time t − 1 to income rank
k+3 or k− 3 in period t. Hence, this allows to analyse mobility by eﬀectively
using information in the rest of the cells in matrix P apart from those in its
diagonal.49
Table 3.12 reproduces the main results of Table 4.3 but switching the depen-
dent variable mobilityi,t by the newly created measure of mobility jumpi,t.50 A
cut in the marginal tax rate of 1 percentage point increases the average num-
ber of income deciles that a household would cross while moving in the pre-tax
income distribution by 0.013 (standard error of 0.001, column 1 of Table 3.12).
But in some, occasions this role corresponds to the wife (e.g. when the female prefers to be
designated as the head).
49The average of variable jumpi,t in the sample is 0.89. The average number of income
ranks crossed by those who move in the income distribution is 1.61.
50Estimations in Table 3.12 also include the average tax rate as an explanatory variable.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the marginal tax rates remain quantitatively the same when
average tax rate is not included, but are estimated with higher standard errors, reducing
their statistical significance.
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The estimated coeﬃcient when considering a post-tax income distribution is
very similar (point estimate of -0.012, standard error of 0.01, column 2) and
slightly smaller (point estimate of -0.008, column 3) when considering a post-
transfers income distribution.
Results are, as expected, reduced by half when the number of ranks are
lowered from 10 (deciles) to 5 (quintiles). Columns 4-6 of Table 3.12 report
these results, with point estimates between -0.005 and -0.006 depending on the
measure of income considered. All the coeﬃcients of the marginal tax rates on
Table 3.12 are significant at confidence levels of 95%.
Dynamic specifications. Following the model described in Section 3.2, the
eﬀect of taxation on the probability of income mobility is determined in the
labour market, which is the result of a static optimisation problem. There
are however reasons for believing the idea that this eﬀect could have some
dynamic structure. For example, decisions on changes in asset income as a
result of variation in taxes may take more than a period to take eﬀect (since
wealth accumulation is the result of an inter-temporal problem).
To account for these eﬀects, I estimate versions of Equation 3.3 that diﬀer
in the dynamic eﬀect of the marginal tax rate τi,t on the probability of income
mobility. Table 3.13 (columns 1 and 2) reports the estimated coeﬃcients of
the marginal tax rate when its eﬀect is assumed to be lagged one period. The
point estimates (-0.57 and -0.41 for pre-tax and post-tax income specifications;
standard errors of 0.24) are smaller although still significantly diﬀerent from
zero (at levels of confidence of 90 and 95%). When the tax rate is lagged
two periods (columns 3 and 4), the eﬀect is positive but insignificant when
considering pre-tax income, and positive and only marginally significant when
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Table 3.12: IV Estimation Jumps with ATR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
jump (D)
pre-tax
jump (D)
post-tax
jump (D)
post-trans
jump (Q)
pre-tax
jump (Q)
post-tax
jump (Q)
post-trans
τt -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
τ¯t -0.112 -0.126 -0.002 -0.045 -0.062 -0.029
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
age (H) -0.000 0.002 0.067 -0.005 -0.000 0.042
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
age (W) 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
family size 0.016 0.014 -0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
num children -0.139∗ -0.148∗ -0.022 -0.055 -0.067 -0.032
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
working wife 0.174 0.202 -0.060 0.068 0.106 0.024
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
health status -0.042 -0.041 -0.016 -0.037 -0.025 -0.047∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
1st stage F-stat 944 944 948 944 944 948
N 50745 50745 47742 50745 50745 47742
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the number of income
ranks (in deciles, D, or quintiles, Q) crossed along the income distribution. Tax reforms are
used as instruments for the marginal tax rate τt and the average tax rate τ¯t. Specifications
also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-
transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and
individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1,
∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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considering post-tax income.51 Further lags of the tax rate results on negative
but insignificant coeﬃcients: columns 5 and 6 report the estimates for τt−3.
Lags beyond 3 remain negative but are usually insignificant (not reported).
These results suggest that the eﬀect of taxes on income mobility is most no-
ticeable on impact and during the following year. I do not find significant
evidence on the eﬀect of tax reforms on income mobility beyond that time.
Table 3.13 replicates the robustness check described in the previous para-
graph but considering mobility across income quintiles. As with the case of
deciles, the estimated coeﬃcients on the lagged marginal tax rate are nega-
tive and significant (above 95%), but slightly higher: -0.79 and -0.53 (with
standard errors of 0.23 and 0.24) for the specifications of pre-tax and post-tax
income. Lagging the marginal rate further, results in estimated coeﬃcients not
statistically diﬀerent from 0 (in the case of a two-period lag, the coeﬃcients
are positive and insignificant, but become negative -and still insignificant, for
long horizons).
3.6 Additional Evidence on Taxation and Mo-
bility
3.6.1 The heterogenous eﬀects of taxes
This subsection analyses how diﬀerent are the eﬀects of changes in marginal
taxation on income mobility across diﬀerent levels of education. The degree of
education can be a proxy for labour market skills. It is therefore interesting to
analyse the income mobility dynamics for two sub-samples: households led by
51This is the only specification where the eﬀect of τi,t−2 is both positive and significant.
Specifications when considering income quintiles (see Table3.14), post-transfer income (not
reported) or further controls (not reported) do not find this coeﬃcient to be significant.
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Table 3.13: Robustness to diﬀerent lags of the marginal tax rate (deciles of
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
τt−1 -0.569∗∗ -0.414∗
(0.24) (0.24)
τt−2 0.231 0.484∗
(0.27) (0.27)
τt−3 -0.280 -0.264
(0.30) (0.30)
age (H) -0.633∗∗ -0.652∗∗ -0.175 0.510 2.814 0.105
(0.29) (0.29) (2.17) (2.17) (2.29) (2.29)
age (W) 0.229 0.177 0.613∗ 0.271 0.096 0.255
(0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.40) (0.40)
family size -0.657 -0.804 -0.444 -0.435 -0.876 -0.963
(0.61) (0.61) (0.65) (0.65) (0.69) (0.69)
num children 0.128 -0.066 0.355 0.061 0.211 -0.132
(0.62) (0.62) (0.67) (0.67) (0.71) (0.71)
working wife 0.900 -0.082 0.435 0.039 0.781 0.961
(0.84) (0.84) (0.89) (0.89) (0.96) (0.96)
health status 1.236 0.613 2.123 2.292 1.619 2.295
(1.27) (1.29) (1.40) (1.43) (1.52) (1.54)
1st stage F-stat 1583 1583 1395 1395 1180 1180
N 48507 48507 41118 41118 35449 35449
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
to a diﬀerent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for
the marginal tax rate τt. Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI,
post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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Table 3.14: Robustness to diﬀerent lags of the marginal tax rate (quintiles of
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
τt−1 -0.790∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗
(0.23) (0.24)
τt−2 0.129 0.153
(0.26) (0.26)
τt−3 -0.270 -0.321
(0.28) (0.28)
age (H) -0.744∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗ 1.484 1.687 2.203 0.395
(0.29) (0.29) (2.03) (2.02) (2.18) (2.16)
age (W) 0.574∗∗ 0.318 0.889∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗ 0.249 0.450
(0.27) (0.28) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37)
family size 0.149 -0.720 0.607 -0.130 0.144 -0.103
(0.59) (0.58) (0.62) (0.62) (0.66) (0.66)
num children -0.956 -0.173 -0.508 -0.491 -0.462 -0.738
(0.60) (0.59) (0.63) (0.63) (0.67) (0.67)
working wife -0.297 -0.296 -1.639∗ -1.022 -1.705∗ -1.194
(0.83) (0.83) (0.87) (0.87) (0.94) (0.94)
health status -1.328 -1.387 -0.668 -0.971 0.535 0.722
(1.25) (1.25) (1.37) (1.36) (1.47) (1.47)
1st stage F-stat 1583 1583 1395 1395 1180 1180
N 48507 48507 41118 41118 35449 35449
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
to a diﬀerent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for
the marginal tax rate τt. Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI,
post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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a head that has completed college education and households whose head has
a level of education below college graduate.
I now re-estimate Equation 3.3 with diﬀerent dependent variables. First,
I create a binary variable to describe upward movements in the income dis-
tribution, upi,t, taking value 1 when the income of a households move up to
a higher income rank. Similarly, I create a variable that considers downward
movements in the income distribution, downi,t (with value of 1 when income
rank moves to a lower position). For comparison I also define a variable deter-
mining immobility as stayi,t = 1−mobilityi,t.
Table 3.15 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of the marginal tax rates in the
income mobility variables described in the previous paragraph for the sample of
non-college households.52 It is worth noting that, for this sample of non-college
graduates, the spouse’s participation in the labour market is an important
determinant of income mobility: a working spouse increases the likelihood of
moving up by about 17% (columns 1 and 2, standard error of 1.09), while
it reduces the probability of moving down by about 18% (columns 5 and 6,
standard error of 1.44). A one percentage point increase in the marginal tax
rate increases the probability of moving down to lower deciles of income by
about 1% (columns 5 and 6, standard error of 0.4) and increases the likelihood
of moving up in the income distribution to a higher extent, by around 1.5%
(columns 1 and 2, standard errors of 0.27). Consistently with the results of
Table 4.3, higher tax rates lead to a higher probability of remaining in the
same income decile: point estimates of 0.915% and 0.728% (standard errors
52The estimated coeﬃcients for the mobility variables are related by βmove = βup +
βdown, where βmove = −βstay. In the regressions shown in Tables 3.15 and 3.15 we have
that βup + βstay + βdown is not usually 0. This is due to diﬀerences in the samples used:
specifications for variable upi,t (columns 1 and 2) exclude households with an income in time
t − 1 belonging to the 10th decile, while specifications for variable downi,t (columns 5 and
6) exclude households with an income in time t− 1 belonging to the 1st decile. This sample
adjustment is done to account for the fact that households in the top (bottom) decile cannot
experience further upward (downward) movements in the income distribution.
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of 0.26) for specifications of pre-tax income (column 3) and post-tax income
(column 4).53
Table 3.16 reports the results for a sub-sample of households led by a head
with completed college education. The estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy of
working spouse is still large and significant, but smaller compared to those in
Table 3.15.54 Marginal tax rates are found to reduce the probability of moving
down in the income distribution (columns 5 and 6), with point estimates of -1
and -1.3 (standard errors of 0.49) for the pre-tax and post-tax specifications,
respectively. The eﬀect on the probability of moving up in the income distri-
bution, despite being positive, is not significant at usual confidence levels. For
this sub-sample, higher tax rates also reduce mobility: by 1.1% when consid-
ering a distribution of post-tax income, although the point estimate of 0.5 is
not significant for specifications of pre-tax income (standard errors of 0.51 in
both cases).
To sum up, higher marginal tax rates increase mobility in both samples
(less clearly in the case of college graduates). But the eﬀects on upward and
downward mobility are the opposite: non-college are, on average, more likely
to move down in the income distribution, while college households are likely to
move up (or, at least, less likely to move down) as a result of an increase in the
marginal tax rates. These results, although should be taken with caution due
to the increased uncertainty resulting from smaller samples, have important
policy implications. Fiscal reforms that homogeneously reduce marginal tax
rates seem to contribute to income mobility by making households with non-
college education more likely to occupy relatively higher positions within the
income distribution (and vice versa for college-graduated households).
53The results in the regressions in Tables 3.15 and 3.15 are robust to the inclusion of lag
income as and additional control (not reported).
54This is probably the result of a higher percentage of employed wifes in the college-
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Table 3.15: IV estimates: households without college educations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
up
pre-tax
up
post-tax
stay
pre-tax
stay
post-tax
down
pre-tax
down
post-tax
τt -1.435∗∗∗ -1.468∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.39) (0.39)
age (H) -0.162 0.059 0.492 0.315 -0.164 -0.231
(0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34)
age (W) -0.300 -0.426 -0.114 -0.017 0.325 0.380
(0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
family size -0.824 -1.254∗ 0.187 0.369 0.302 0.665
(0.69) (0.70) (0.67) (0.68) (0.77) (0.78)
num children 0.992 1.616∗∗ -0.225 -0.432 -0.498 -1.032
(0.72) (0.73) (0.70) (0.71) (0.80) (0.81)
working wife 16.792∗∗∗ 16.364∗∗∗ -2.830∗∗ -2.099∗ -18.930∗∗∗ -19.024∗∗∗
(1.09) (1.09) (1.10) (1.10) (1.44) (1.44)
health status -0.002 -0.523 -0.292 -0.942 1.082 2.748
(1.47) (1.48) (1.39) (1.39) (1.66) (1.68)
1st stage F-stat 1181 1181 1181 1181 781 781
N 38417 38417 39766 39766 32229 32229
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving
up to a higher income decile (columns 1 and 2), staying in the same decile (columns 3 and
4) or moving down to a lower decile (columns 5 and 6). Sample is restricted to observations
where the head of the household has not completed college education. Households with
income in time t − 1 belonging to the 10th decile are excluded from specifications 1 and
2. Households with income in time t − 1 belonging to the 1st decile are excluded from
specifications 5 and 6. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate τt.
Specifications also diﬀer on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-
tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and
include time and individual fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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Table 3.16: IV estimates: households with college education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
up
pre-tax
up
post-tax
stay
pre-tax
stay
post-tax
down
pre-tax
down
post-tax
τt 0.438 0.071 0.480 1.061∗∗ -0.994∗∗ -1.302∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.56) (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49)
age (H) -0.084 -0.654 0.352 0.503 0.190 0.320
(0.77) (0.77) (0.55) (0.52) (0.48) (0.50)
age (W) -0.526 -0.029 0.308 0.029 0.029 0.007
(0.74) (0.74) (0.52) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48)
family size 1.377 0.793 0.038 0.340 -0.155 0.385
(1.75) (1.73) (1.39) (1.39) (1.20) (1.22)
num children 0.006 0.220 1.443 2.180 -1.849 -2.948∗∗
(1.72) (1.71) (1.36) (1.36) (1.17) (1.19)
working wife 12.092∗∗∗ 13.099∗∗∗ 1.844 -0.323 -9.713∗∗∗ -8.397∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.15) (2.01) (2.03) (1.86) (1.88)
health status -1.956 -1.830 1.129 0.395 -1.252 -0.691
(3.43) (3.46) (3.02) (3.01) (2.84) (2.74)
1st stage F-stat 387 387 426 426 441 441
N 8259 8259 10556 10556 10316 10316
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving up
to a higher income decile (columns 1 and 2), staying in the same decile (columns 3 and 4) or
moving down to a lower decile (columns 5 and 6). Sample is restricted to observations where
the head of the household has completed college education. Households with income in time
t− 1 belonging to the 10th decile are excluded from specifications 1 and 2. Households with
income in time t−1 belonging to the 1st decile are excluded from specifications 5 and 6.Tax
reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate τt. Specifications also diﬀer on
how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI).
Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual
fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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3.6.2 Do taxes increase mobility at the tails of the dis-
tribution?
This subsection analyses how changes in taxation aﬀect mobility at the tails
of the income distribution. Particularly, I estimate the eﬀect of changes in the
marginal tax rates on the probability that households in the bottom or top
deciles of income remain in that position.
As in the previous subsection, I estimate Equation 3.3 with diﬀerent de-
pendent variable. For households in the bottom decile of income, I construct a
new dependent (binary) variable, upi,t, that takes value of 1 when the house-
hold moves up to a diﬀerent decile. Similarly, variable downi,t takes value of 1
when a household in the top decile of income moves down in the distribution.55
Table 3.17 reports the estimates for households in the bottom decile (columns
1-3) and households in the top decile (4-5). The eﬀect of an increase in the
marginal tax rate on the probability that a poor households climbs to an up-
per position of the income distribution is negative and highly significant: point
estimates range between -1.71 and -1.44 (standard errors of 0.23-0.26).
To understand the magnitude of this eﬀect, consider a decrease of the
marginal tax rate by 7 percentage points. This tax cut can explain around a
quarter of the probability of leaving the bottom decile.56
The eﬀect of tax rates on mobility in the top decile is less clear. The
point estimates are negative, what would suggest that higher taxes increase the
probability that households in the top decile remain in that position. However,
the point estimates are associated to very high standard errors (in excess of
0.90) and therefore not significant at conventional levels.
graduated sample (75% versus 68%).
55The aggregate probability of moving away from the tails of the income distribution, i.e.
1− P 1,1 and 1− P 10,10 of mobility matrix P in Equation 4.3 are shown in Figure A5.
56The average likelihood of leaving the bottom decile is 45%.
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Table 3.17: IV estimates: households in bottom and top deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
up
pre-tax
up
post-tax
up
post-trans
down
pre-tax
down
post-tax
down
post-trans
τt -1.564∗∗∗ -1.719∗∗∗ -1.441∗∗∗ -0.620 -0.713 -0.644
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.94) (0.91) (0.91)
age (H) 1.237 1.218 2.850 0.303 0.764 2.790
(0.81) (0.77) (4.51) (0.63) (0.66) (5.09)
age (W) -0.303 -0.269 0.004 -0.103 -0.364 0.133
(0.80) (0.76) (0.78) (0.63) (0.64) (0.60)
family size 0.238 -0.831 -0.201 -2.026 -0.997 -0.058
(1.54) (1.55) (1.77) (1.52) (1.61) (1.63)
num children 2.588 4.343∗∗∗ 4.509∗∗ -0.742 -2.839∗ -4.887∗∗∗
(1.60) (1.65) (1.95) (1.62) (1.69) (1.78)
working wife 22.714∗∗∗ 22.091∗∗∗ 20.406∗∗∗ -16.340∗∗∗ -17.331∗∗∗ -17.583∗∗∗
(1.90) (1.92) (2.02) (3.78) (3.65) (3.96)
health status -1.449 -0.469 1.695 8.676∗∗ 10.286∗∗ 7.548∗
(2.89) (3.01) (3.26) (3.91) (4.46) (4.58)
1st stage F-stat 456 439 438 90 91 73
N 6961 6830 6313 3330 3379 3170
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eﬀects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving up
to a higher income decile for households in the bottom decile (columns 1-3) or the probability
of moving to a lower decile for households in the top decile (columns 4-6). Tax reforms are
used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate τt. Specifications also diﬀer on how income
is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span
is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual fixed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗
pvalue p < 0.01.
122
Chapter 3. The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility
3.7 Conclusion
Rising inequality has triggered a debate on what is the role that fiscal policy
should play in addressing economic disparities. However, taxes are likely to
have an impact on other features of the income distribution beyond inequality.
This chapter considers the eﬀect of fiscal policy on income mobility. I exploit
the variation in marginal tax rates originated by several reforms in the US to
estimate how likely is that the relative position of a household in the income
distribution changes when taxes vary. The resulting evidence suggest that
lower marginal tax rates foster mobility along the income distribution. Par-
ticularly, an increase of one percentage point in the marginal tax rate causes
a decline of around 0.8% in the probability that a household’s income changes
to a diﬀerent decile of the income distribution. A change in the marginal tax
rate of 7 percentage points accounts for around a tenth of the average likeli-
hood of movements in the income distribution (and around a quarter of the
average probability that a household in the bottom decile moves to a higher
position). The mechanism that brings about this eﬀect seems to be based on
the distortions induced by taxes in the labour market decisions.
These empirical results have important implications for the design of fiscal
policy. Tax reforms that reduce marginal rates are more likely to increase
equality of opportunity (as measured by the degree of income mobility). This
is because an attenuation of the distortionary eﬀects of taxes in the labour
market would make households more likely to take advantage of economic
opportunities and move up in the income distribution. Therefore, fiscal policies
that aim to reduce inequality should weight the trade-oﬀ in households’ welfare
induced by the eﬀect on income mobility.
This analysis can be extended in several ways. First, this chapter highlights
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the need to address the potentially diﬀerent eﬀects of taxation on income in-
equality and income mobility. A comprehensive analysis of fiscal policy should
jointly address these issues. The interaction of a progressive tax schedule with
income inequality and mobility necessitates a structural general equilibrium
model that generates heterogeneity in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994) while al-
lowing for relevant labour supply decisions. This framework would allow for a
quantification of the impact of welfare of fiscal policies that address inequality,
both in terms of income and wealth.
This chapter has restricted its attention to mobility in the short run. An-
other interesting avenue is to explore the eﬀects of taxation on social (or in-
tergenerational) mobility. A low degree of association between parents’ and
children’s income is an indicator of higher equality of opportunity. Nybom and
Stuhler (2014) note the importance of shocks aﬀecting the parents in determin-
ing current intergenerational mobility. It is therefore highly relevant from a
policy standpoint to understand whether major fiscal reforms as Tax Revenue
Act of 1986 can have a noticeable impact on children’s future position in the
income distribution.
Finally, my analysis can also be extended to understand the eﬀects of tax-
ation on other dimensions such as job mobility and the decision of becoming
an entrepreneur. The macroeconomic literature that investigates the sources
of wealth inequality has often relied on entrepreneurship as a key element to
understand why rich households accumulate so much wealth (see De Nardi
(2015)).57 Whether the incidence of personal income or corporate income tax-
ation is a factor determining the decision to become self-employed (beyond
wealth accumulation) has important policy implications.
57However, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) highlights that wealth accumulation is only an im-
portant factor on the entrepreneurial decisions for those individuals above the 95% percentile
of wealth.
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Do Tax Changes Aﬀect
Intergenerational Mobility?
4.1 Introduction
The transmission of income status across generations is a central issue in social
sciences. This is a particularly relevant subject for welfare economics, since a
lack of mobility across generations implies the absence of equality of opportu-
nity. This topic has recently attracted much attention in the public debate and
in policy circles.1 But what can policymakers do to address this phenomenon?
This chapter explores how fiscal policy may contribute to the transmission
of the income status from parents to children. This is an important question
from a policy standpoint, since it explores a new dimension through which fis-
cal policy can aﬀect the economy and the society. Recently, the rising income
inequality in the US has started a debate on how fiscal policy should be con-
ducted to address this phenomenon (see Piketty and Saez (2007)). However,
little is known on how changes in taxation facilitates social mobility.
1See Krueger (2012).
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In this chapter, I employ data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics
(PSID) and matches pairs of fathers and sons between 1967 and 2012. I first
compute the degree of intergenerational income mobility and its recent trends
in the US. To do this, I estimate the most frequent parameter in this literature:
the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of income, which quantifies how much of
the income diﬀerences are passed from fathers to sons. Next, I use the TAXSIM
simulator to construct a measure of changes in federal tax liabilities that are
the result of legislated changes in the tax code. This allows me to evaluate
how fiscal policies aﬀect actual tax liabilities in the fathers generation. I then
estimate how those changes in taxation interact with the elasticity of income
mobility between two adjacent periods.
I find that changes in the federal income tax code do aﬀect intergenera-
tional mobility Particularly I find that the diﬀerence in the elasticity between
a family that faces a 1,000-dollar change and a family who does not is around 5
percentage points. A potential mechanism that may bring about these results
is one based on the decision of parents to invest in the stock of human capital
of their children. Reforms that reduce the tax liabilities that parents face,
enable them to use these extra resources in funding education and providing
their children with better opportunities, what would translate in higher inter-
generational mobility. Overall, the results of this paper suggest that, through
income taxation, fiscal policy can impact on the equality of opportunity be-
tween generations. This is an important dimension that policy actions should
take into account when considering their medium run eﬀects.
This chapter relates to an extensive literature on intergenerational mobility
(or social mobility) as surveyed in Fields and Ok (1999), Black and Devereux
(2011) and Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015).2 This literature seeks to quantify the de-
2Fields and Ok (1999) and Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015) also survey the literature on intra-
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gree of association between parents and children income, usually by computing
the elasticity of income in both generations.3
The present chapter follows many elements of the empirical analysis de-
scribed in Solon (1992), Zimmerman (1992). These classic papers highlight
potential econometric issues in estimating the degree of intergenerational mo-
bility, finding that previous estimations of the IGE suﬀered from downward
bias due to transitory shocks that aﬀect income in both generations. Haider
and Solon (2006) and Grawe (2006) identify other sources of biases in the
analysis of intergenerational mobility due to life cycle considerations.4
An important strand of the literature has explored the determinants of
intergenerational mobility. Piketty (2000) surveys theories that explain the
persistence of income across generations, mainly due to the transmission of
productive abilities. Intelligence and innate abilities are also potential deter-
minants of upward social mobility. Hassler and Mora (2000) develop a model
where endogenous growth increases the return of individuals born with higher
cognitive skills, and thus resulting in higher intergenerational mobility. In this
model, when growth is low, the return of innate cognitive abilities is lower com-
pared to other social assets. This results in lower intergenerational mobility,
since the children of the people with high cognitive abilities have an ex-ante
advantage and are more likely to inherit the income status of their parents.
Aghion et al. (2015) explores the possibility that intergenerational mobility is
caused by the degree of innovation and entrepreneurship of the individuals.
The authors employs cross-state panel data from the US to find a positive cor-
relation between innovativeness (measured by the number of patents granted)
generational mobility: the movements across income ranks of people in the same generation
between two periods of time.
3This object is often referred to as the intergenerational elasticity of income (IGE), see
Fields and Ok (1999).
4See Section 4.2 for a more detailed description of these econometric issues.
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and upward intergenerational mobility. The study finds that this correlation
is explained by the entrance of new innovators. Other potential determinants
of social mobility are related with geographical factors.5 Chetty and Hen-
dren (2015), investigate how neighbourhoods aﬀect intergenerational mobility
through childhood exposure eﬀects. The authors find that the children of fam-
ilies that move from areas with low mobility to areas with higher mobility
are more likely to rise in the income distribution. Using quasi-experimental
variation they find that the factors explaining this increase in social mobility
are related to the features of the new neighbourhood, such as higher-quality
schools. This evidence is consistent with Chetty et al. (2016), that find that
a randomised public program that helped to relocate families to better neigh-
bourhoods (the Moving to Opportunity experiment) resulted in higher future
earnings for their children.
This chapter relates to the above literature on the determinants of inter-
generational mobility by analysing the role of fiscal policy in reducing income
diﬀerences across generations. The idea that aggregate shocks aﬀecting the
parents generation can impact on intergenerational mobility has already been
explored in the literature. Nybom and Stuhler (2014) study how events that
aﬀect the distribution of income of the parents may have important eﬀects
on the following generation. The authors construct a model that shows how
changes in policies and institutions can impact on intergenerational mobility
across multiple generations. They use a structural reform that raised the com-
pulsory schooling in Sweden to test the implications of the model.
To the extent that intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity
are closely related, the literature has also explored how the transmission of
5Chetty et al. (2014a) explicitly quantifies the geographical diﬀerences in intergenera-
tional mobility in the US using a large administrative dataset. The authors find that there
is considerable variation in mobility across commuting zones (aggregation of counties).
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income status has evolved over time. Chetty et al. (2014b) use a large US
administrative dataset to measure the evolution of rank-based indicators (the
correlation of parent and child income ranks and the probability that a child
reaches the top of the income distribution). They find that mobility has re-
mained fairly stable for the cohorts born between 1973 and 1993. Aaronson and
Mazumder (2008) construct a new dataset matching individuals from the US
Census to synthetic families in the previous generations (mainly determined by
the state of birth) and find that mobility, measured by the IGE, has declined
since the 1980s. This contrasts with evidence from Lee and Solon (2009), that
use data from the PSID and conclude that the cohorts born between 1952
and 1975 do not exhibit major changes in intergenerational mobility, when
measured by the elasticity of parent-child income. This chapter extend those
results with newer data from the PSID, computing both the frequently used
IGE parameter and rank-based measures; and finding that mobility has not
suﬀered major fluctuations in the last two decades.
The literature or intergenerational mobility has almost exclusively focused
on income dynamics rather than wealth. This contrasts with the attention
that wealth and its distribution have attracted in the last years (see for exam-
ple Piketty (2014), Saez and Zucman (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2015)).
However, a literature investigating the transmission of wealth across genera-
tions has started to develop. Benhabib et al. (2015) analyse what factors are
needed in a heterogeneous-agents model to match the distribution of wealth
and the degree of social mobility across generations. The authors conclude
that the skewness and persistence of earnings, diﬀerential saving and bequest
rates and the existence of capital income risk in entrepreneurial activities are
all necessary factors to account for this matching between the model and the
data. Recently, Adermon et al. (2015) employ Swedish data to find that the
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rank correlation between parents and children wealth ranges from 0.3 to 0.4
Lastly, this chapter also relates to the literature that investigates the eﬀects
of fiscal policy using legislated tax reforms such as Romer and Romer (2010)
and Barro and Redlick (2011). Romer and Romer (2010) produce a narrative
series of federal tax changes in the US, finding substantial aggregate eﬀects of
on economic activity. The current chapter quantifies the size of these reforms
for each family in the PSID using the TAXSIM simulator, in a similar vein to
Gruber and Saez (2002) and Alloza (2016).
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes issues that arise
when estimating the IGE and explores the recent trends in intergenerational
mobility in the last years. Section 4.3 explains the empirical strategy that is
used to estimate the eﬀects of tax variations on the intergenerations elasticity.
The results of these estimations are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 tests
the robustness of the results to diﬀerent specifications. Lastly, Section 4.6
concludes and oﬀers some directions for future research.
4.2 Intergenerational Mobility in the US
This section explores the degree of intergeneration mobility in the US. I employ
data from the PSID between 1967 to 2012 to match the income of fathers and
their sons.6 I restrict the analysis to pairs of fathers and sons of a certain age
and with positive labour income.
To quantify the degree of association of income between two adjacent gen-
erations, I estimate the following regression:
log (incomesoni ) = α + β log
(
incomefatheri
)
+ εi (4.1)
6Section 4.5 includes both sons and daughters in the analyses.
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where incomesoni is the before-tax labour income of the individual (son) i,
and incomefather is the before-tax labour income of his father.7 The coeﬃcient
β is often referred to as the intergenerational elasticity (henceforth IGE) of
income (see Solon (1992) or Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015)). This object measures
the degree of transmission of income diﬀerences from one generation to another.
For example, if we consider the case of a father whose earnings are twice the
average given a value of the IGE β = 0.5, that would imply that the son would
be expected to have a level of income 50% higher than the average. For a value
of β = 0.1, the 100% income diﬀerence in the father’s generation, would only
add to a 10% diﬀerence in the son’s generation.
An estimation of Equation 4.1 implies however two relevant empirical is-
sues. On the first hand, Atkinson (1980) notes how transitory errors that aﬀect
the previous generation income may result in downwardly inconsistent estima-
tions of β in Equation 4.1. A solution to this problem of attenuation bias has
been explored in Solon (1992), Solon (1989) and Zimmerman (1992). Solon
(1992) proposes to consider multi-year averages of parental income instead of a
single year and shows this could lead to higher estimates of the IGE parameter.
There is, however, a second econometric issue. The solution to the problem
of attenuation bias mentioned above, rests on the assumption that transitory
errors behave as classical errors. However, this may not be the case if these
error-in-variables are age-dependent. Following Haider and Solon (2006), con-
sider a relationship between permanent income yi and actual yearly income
yi,t:
yi,t = λt + νi,t (4.2)
7Note that this chapter does not aim at establishing comparisons of living standards
between generations, but rather at exploring the likelihood that sons can generate a level of
income that provides them with an income status similar to that of their parents.
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where νi,t is a transitory error and λt is an age-dependent parameter that
controls how permanent income translates into current income during diﬀerent
periods of the life cycle of a given generation.
When λt = 1 for all periods t, and conditional on certain properties of
νi,t (see Haider and Solon (2006)), the errors in actual income are transitory
and the classical error model is a correct representation of the annual income
process. In that case, the only remaining econometric issue is the attenuation
bias mentioned above. However, it could also be the case of λt < 1 for workers
starting their career, and λt > 1 later in their life cycle. In this situation, a
time-dependent λt induces another source of inconsistency in the estimation of
the IGE parameter β in Equation 4.1, known as the life cycle bias (see Haider
and Solon (2006)).8
The consequence of this problem is that the estimate of β (the IGE) suﬀers
from a downward bias earlier in the life cycle and is overestimated at a later
stage. The solution to this problem is to estimate the degree of intergenera-
tional mobility when the λ of each generation is approximately similar, so we
would be eﬀectively comparing individuals at a similar stage of their life cycle.
Grawe (2006) computes the degree of attenuation and life cycle bias present
in the US and finds that using observations of income for fathers and sons at
similar points in their life cycle (or points in time when λ = 1 and therefore
measurement errors are approximately classical) reduces the life cycle bias.9
8The models that dispute the assumption of transitory income shocks having the same
properties as classical measures and, therefore, assuming an income model similar to Equa-
tion 4.2 are known as generalized-error-in variables. See Haider and Solon (2006) and Ja¨ntti
and Jenkins (2015).
9In a recent paper, Nybom and Stuhler (2016) use nearly actual lifetime income profiles of
fathers and sons in Sweden to show that the generalized-error-in-variables model proposed
by Haider and Solon (2006) and Grawe (2006) do not fully eliminate the life cycle bias.
Moreover, the income model described in Equation 4.2 rests on the hypothesis that the
parameter λ is the same for both generations. This assumes that the relationship between
permanent and actual income has remained unchanged in the two or three decades that
separate the fathers and sons generations, ignoring potential delays in the labour market
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To account for the econometric issues above, in the next subsections I (i)
explore the trends of intergeneration mobility using similar moments in the life
cycle of fathers and sons (to reduce the life cycle bias) and (ii) estimate the β
in Equation 4.1 using multi-year averages of income to reduce the attenuation
bias.
4.2.1 Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility
To gain some insights on the recent evolution of the degree of transmission
of the income status between fathers and sons, I estimate Equation 4.1 for
each year between 1992 and 2012. I establish a comparison of the annual (pre-
tax) income of fathers and sons when both generations are separated by time
periods of 25 years (i.e. I am eﬀectively using data from 1967 to 2012). I
consider only the subset of the PSID sample that is considered representative
at the national level (the so-called core sample).10 Further to this, I restrict
the sample to fathers and sons who are head of households, earn a positive
labour income, and are aged 30 to 40. This last criterion aims at reducing the
life cycle bias mentioned at the beginning of this section, while keeping the
number of observations big enough to obtain precise estimates.
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the IGE parameter between 1992 and
2012. The elasticity fluctuates around an average value of 0.30. Higher values
of the parameter indicate a greater degree of immobility (more intergenera-
tional persistence of the income status from fathers to sons). The elasticity
seems to pick up slightly in the 1990s and fall moderately in the following
decade, only to pick up again towards the end of the sample. Despite these
entry due to more extended periods of education.
10The PSID survey was originally created by merging two samples: the Survey Research
Center (SRC) or core sample (representative at the national level), and the Survey of Eco-
nomic opportunity (SEO) or Census sample, which over-represents low income households.
The results of this section are robust to including only the SRC core sample or both of them.
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slight fluctuations, the evolution of the intergenerational elasticity does not
show significant variations. This result is in line with Lee and Solon (2009),
which also compute the IGE parameter and Chetty et al. (2014b), which mea-
sure intergenerational mobility with rank correlations of parental and children’s
income employing a large administrative database.
When estimating Equation 4.1 with a pooled sample of all years, the value
of the estimated IGE is 0.30 (with a standard error of 0.3). This value indicates
that during the sample period considered, the income diﬀerence of a father with
respect to other fathers at that time, is transmitted to the next generation in
around 30% (on average).
To further analyse the recent trends of intergenerational mobility in the
US, I compare the annual evolution between 1992 and 2012 of the IGE and
the Gini coeﬃcient, a commonly used measure of inequality.11
Figure 4.2 plots such a relationship between mobility and inequality. The
two show a positive co-movement, with a significant correlation coeﬃcient
of 0.53. This figure seems to indicate that times of higher intergenerational
mobility are associated with times of greater inequality.
This concept has recently drawn attention from policy makers (Krueger
(2012)), since relates two concepts that are of great interest for a society:
equality of opportunity across generations and inequality. When the relation-
ship between these phenomena is explored using a cross section of countries,
Figure 4.2 is often referred to as “The Great Gatsby” curve.12 The importance
of this relationship has also been recently highlighted by Chetty et al. (2014a),
which find that US areas that exhibit high levels of inequality also tend to
11The Gini coeﬃcient ranges from 0 (all income is equally earned across the entire pop-
ulation) and 1 (the point of maximal inequality, where only one person earns the totality of
the income).
12The Great Gatsby curve owes its name to the then-chairman of the U.S. Council of
Economic Advisors (see Krueger (2012)).
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the IGE
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Note: The blue solid line shows the evolution of the intergenerational elasticity of income
between 1992-2012 (using data since 1967), defined as the β in Equation 4.1. The sample
is restricted to fathers and sons aged 30-40 with a time gap between generations of 25
years. Only individuals that are heads of households and earn a positive labor income
are considered. The sample is further restricted to members of the PSID considered to
be representative at the national level (core sample). The red dashed lines represent two
(robust) standard errors.
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Figure 4.2: The Great Gatsby Curve
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Note: The horizontal axis shows the degree of intergenerational mobility (higher values of
IGE mean more immobility). The vertical axis shows the Gini coeﬃcient (a measure of the
degree of income inequality). The sample period refers to 1992-2012 (using data since 1967).
The sample is restricted to fathers and sons aged 30-40 with a time gap between generations
of 25 years. Only individuals that are heads of households and earn a positive labor income
are considered. The sample is further restricted to members of the PSID considered to
be representative at the national level (core sample). The red dashed lines represent two
(robust) standard errors.
display less upward mobility for children from low-income families.
Lastly, Figure 4.3 shows a map of the IGE across US states. The results
from this exercise show substantial geographical variation.13 The Great Plains
and the West Coast show a higher degree of mobility compared to the East
Coast. Interestingly, Chetty et al. (2014a) uses a large administrative dataset
and find that both the Great Plains and the West Coast exhibit a high level
13States that do not have enough number of observations are left out of the sample.
The geographical patterns remain qualitatively similar when these states are included in the
analysis.
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Figure 4.3: IGE across US States
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Note: Intergenerational elasticity of income across US states between 1992-2012 (using data
since 1967), defined as the β in Equation 4.1. The sample is restricted to fathers and sons
aged 30-50 with a time gap between generations of 25 years. Only individuals that are
heads of households and earn a positive labor income are considered. The sample is further
restricted to members of the PSID considered to be representative at the national level (core
sample). States with insuﬃcient data (less than 40 observations) are dropped from the
sample.
of upward mobility (measured as the rank correlation between parental and
children income), while the Southeast remains the area with the lowest degree
of upward mobility.
4.2.2 Measuring Intergeneration Mobility Using Per-
manent Income
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the use of annual income data
may result in downwardly biased estimations as a consequence of measure-
ment error (attenuation bias). Equation 4.2 decomposes actual income into
permanent and a transitory components. In this section, we follow, among
others, Solon (1992) and estimate the IGE using permanent income. To do
this I take multiyear averages of reported income. This method aims at reduc-
ing the attenuation eﬀect that arises from the presence of transitory shocks in
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Equation 4.2.
By looking at narrowly defined age groups, I estimate the IGE of two
adjacent generations at similar moments in their life cycle. Particularly I look
at average earnings from fathers and sons when they are 40 to 50 years old (in
an attempt to measure income at the peak of their careers), and when they
are 30 to 40 years old.
Measuring income in this way reduces the number of observations (since
each person now appears only once during the sample period), but takes into
account both econometric issues related to attenuation and life-cycle biases
mentioned at the beginning of the section.14
Table 4.1 shows the results of estimating β in Equation 4.1 when income
is a multi-year average. When considering income at the peak of their life-life
cycle (40 to 50 years old), the IGE is estimated to be around 0.38 (standard
error of 0.06), as reported in the first column of Table 4.1. As noted in Solon
(1992), this number is higher than estimations using actual instad of multiyear
averages of income (as in Figure 4.1). An estimation of the intergenerational
elasticity of around 0.38 implies that for a father who earns 50,000 dollars
less than the average, around 38% of that diﬀerence will be passed on to
his son (i.e. the son will earn around 19,000 dollars less than the average).
This estimate is slightly smaller when we consider as measure of income the
average earnings from years 30 to 40. In this case (column 3 in Table 4.1),
the IGE is 0.33 (standard error of .04). Both estimates are similar when we
include a set of demographic and socioeconomic variables as controls, with an
intergenerational elasticity estimate at around 0.30-0.31 (with standard errors
14To increase the degrees of freedom, the sample incorporates both the SRC core and
SEO subsamples from the PSID. Probability weights are used to render the resulting sample
representative of the US population. However, results are robust to the inclusion or omission
of the SEO subsample.
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Table 4.1: IGE using Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
age 40-50 age 40-50 age 30-40 age 30-40
incomefather 0.378∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
controls NO YES NO YES
N 1201 1201 1793 1793
Note: Estimations of β in log (incomesoni ) = α + β log
(
incomefatheri
)
+ εi. Columns (1)
and (2) compute income as the multiyear-average during ages 40 to 50. Columns (1) and
(2) compute income as the multiyear-average during ages 30 to 40. Columns (2) and (4)
include as controls the ages of the father and son, the number of children in the son’s family,
and dummy variables if the son is married, if the son’s wife is engaged in the labour market
and if the son’s parents come from a poor economic background. Robust standard errors
are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
of 0.04 to 0.07).15
Overall these numbers suggest that, on average, around a third of the
income diﬀerences exhibited by fathers are passed on to their sons in the US
during this sample period.
4.2.3 Transitions Across Income Categories
In this subsection I analyse intergenerational mobility with a diﬀerent frame-
work as the one summarised by Equation 4.1. Following Chetty et al. (2014b),
the joint distribution of income of fathers and sons can be decomposed in two
elements: the joint distribution of father and son income (which is also known
as the copula of the distribution) and the marginal distribution of father and
son income. While the IGE parameter in Equation 4.1 picks up features from
both the copula and the marginal distribution, I will now consider quintile
transition matrices, which solely depend on the copula.
The importance of using transition matrices to analyse intergenerational
15Control variables include the ages of the father and son, the number of children in the
son’s family, and dummy variables if the son is married, if the son’s wife is engaged in the
labour market and if the son’s parents come from a poor economic background.
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mobility is twofold.16 On the one hand it fully controls for marginal distribu-
tions, allowing to focus on the joint distribution of income as mentioned above.
And on the other hand, it allows us to analyse asymmetries in the transmis-
sion of income status. This is because the β coeﬃcient in Equation 4.1 is only
informative of the average persistence of income (i.e. it is not informative of
how big the fluctuations around the average are). The transition matrices,
however, allow for these features by indicating whether, for example, mobility
is higher at the top or at the bottom of the distribution.17
To use transition matrices, I consider an ordering of income for generation
t in 5 diﬀerent ranks (quintiles of income). The intergenerational mobility
process can be represented by the following equation:
st = Pst−1 (4.3)
The vector st−1 summarises the probability distribution of fathers income in
period t− 1, while the vector st refers to the sons income. Notice that since st
and st−1 are uniform distributions by construction, the matrix P fully charac-
terises the mobility process by determining the probability that a son with a
father belonging to income group n remains in the same quintile as his father
(entry P n,n in matrix P) or transits to another quintile k ̸= n.
Table 4.2 computes the matrix of probability of transitions for our 1967-
2012 sample of fathers and sons, when income is measured as the multiyear
average between ages 40 and 50. The main diagonal shows the probability that
a son achieves the same income quintile as his fathers. Elements above (below)
16Ja¨ntti and Jenkins (2015) recognise the importance of using transition matrices to
analyse intergenerational mobility and highlight the fact that the literature has neglected
the use of this object.
17An alternative would be to consider nonparametric estimates. Although the literature
has not profusely explored this avenue, some studies (see for example Eide and Showalter
(1999)) have estimated quantile regressions of Equation 4.1.
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the diagonal show upward (downward) movements in the income distribution
between both generations.
The sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix (the trace) summarises
the degree of intergenerational immobility present in the society. The extreme
case of perfect immobility (where the income status of the fathers predetermine
that of the sons) would imply that the matrix P is equal to the identity matrix.
The case of total origin independence (no relation between fathers’ and sons’
income ranks) would mean that matrix the P has the same value in each entry
of the matrix (in our case, that would be 4%). The matrix in Table 4.2 shows
a moderate level of persistence of income status. The Shorrocks Index (see
Shorrocks (1978b)), which measures the degree of immobility, has a value of
0.83 (with 0 being a completely immobile society).
Table 4.2 shows some other interesting patterns at the extreme of the dis-
tributions. A third of the poorest sons also have the poorest fathers. This
is even more dramatic when considering the top quintile: around 42% of the
richest parents have their sons occupying the same income position one genera-
tion later. Focusing on the most extreme intergenerational movements, around
8% of the sons born to the poorest fathers, make it to the top of the income
distribution. Conversely, 7.4% of the sons of the richest fathers fall to the
bottom quintile of income. Interestingly, Table 4.2 also shows a certain degree
of asymmetry, which would imply that intergenerational mobility may diﬀer
along the income distribution.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section I present the empirical strategy that I use to understand how
changes in fiscal policy may aﬀect the transmission of economic status across
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Table 4.2: Matrix of Transition of Probabilities
Destination
Origin Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 33.33 26.67 18.33 13.33 8.33
Q2 22.68 27.84 22.68 19.59 7.22
Q3 12.64 24.73 21.98 24.18 16.48
Q4 14.13 11.96 20.11 27.72 26.09
Q5 7.39 10.23 19.32 21.02 42.05
Note: Probabilities that a son moves to a quintile of income with respect to the quintile
of income of his father. Rows indicate quintiles of income of fathers and columns refer to
quintile of incomes of sons. Income is measured as the multiyear average between the ages
of 40 and 50.
generations. Particularly, I estimate the following regression:
log
(
incomesoni,t
)
= α + β log
(
incomefatheri,t
)
+ γ∆TAXi,t
+ δ log
(
incomefatheri,t
)
∆TAXi,t + ξi,t
(4.4)
where incomesoni is the before-tax annual labour income of the individual (son)
i, and incomefather is the before-tax annual labour income of his father. Both
fathers and sons are aged between 30 and 40 years, and each generation is
separated between 25 years.
∆TAXi,t is defined as:
∆TAXi,t = TAX
t
i,t − TAX t−1i,t (4.5)
where TAX ti,t is the actual tax liability (in thousands of dollars) that the father
i faces in year t given his income and the tax code that was present in that
year. TAX t−1i,t is the counterfactual tax rate that the father i would have paid
with his current income had the tax code in t − 1 still be present in time
t. That is, TAX ti,t eﬀectively computes the variation in the tax bill that a
father faces as a consequence of a change in the tax code. In this way, positive
values of TAX ti,t indicate that the father has seen his tax liabilities increased
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as a consequence of a hike in the features of the tax code that are relevant
according to his specific circumstances.
To compute TAX ti,t and TAX
t−1
i,t I employ TAXSIM, a tax simulator hosted
by the NBER. When computing the tax liabilities I take into account tax-
relevant features of both the father and his wife (if he is legally married).
Particularly, I take into account the tax year code, marital status (I assume
that married people jointly file taxes), number of dependants (including those
under 17 years), labour income from the head of the household and his spouse,
asset income (arising from rentals, dividends or interests), taxable pensions,
Social Security Income, property taxes and deductions on mortgage interests.18
Equation 4.4 departs from Equation 4.1 by adding two additional terms
related to changes in fiscal policy. The interaction of the TAX ti,t and father’s
income is of particular interest, because it summarises how changes in tax
liabilities aﬀect the degree of transmission of income diﬀerences between fathers
and sons.
4.4 Results
This section describes the results of the estimation of Equation 4.4, and Ta-
ble 4.3 summarises the findings.
The first column of the table estimates Equation 4.4 setting β = δ = 0,
i.e. a version of Equation 4.1.19 The results indicate an IGE of almost 0.35
(standard error of 0.02), what implies that on average, slightly more than a
third of the income diﬀerences in the fathers’ generation are transmitted to
18Due to data availability, this analysis focuses on federal income tax liabilities only (state
and payroll taxes are not contemplated).
19The only diﬀerence with the sample used in Figure 4.1 is the inclusion of the SEO sub-
sample and the use of probability weights (to render the sample representative). Results are
robust to the omission of this subsample, as shown in Section 4.5.
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the sons’ generation.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.3 include the variable TAX ti,t additively and
interacting with fathers income, respectively. The inclusion of these variables
does not significantly alter the IGE parameter. When only TAX ti,t is included,
the point estimate becomes -0.005 (standard error of 0.02). This implies that
an increase of 1000 dollars in taxes for the father, is associated with a decrease
of around 0.5% of the son’s income in the next generation.
Adding an interaction term (column 3) brings about an important result:
the eﬀect of the father’s income on his son’s income (i.e. the transmission
of income status) depends on tax policies that aﬀect the father. Or in other
words, the IGE varies with respect to taxation.
To see this, consider the intragenerational elasticity of a pair of father and
son where the father has not been aﬀected by a tax policy. According to the
coeﬃcient in the regression represented in column 3, the IGE is 0.32. Consider
now a father-son pair where the father faces a 1,000-dollar increase in tax
liabilities. This results in an elasticity of 0.37.
Column 4 of Table 4.3 includes year dummies in the regression of Equa-
tion 4.4 that aim to account for potential macroeconomic shocks that aﬀect
in the same fashion to all individuals. The results are not substantially al-
tered, and the intergenerational elasticity evaluated at the average value of
TAX ti,t (0.28) is 0.314 (compared to a value of 0.304 when the time dummies
are omitted).
Column 5 adds some demographic and socioeconomic controls (as men-
tioned in Section 4.2 and the footnote of Table 4.3). The results are in line
with previous specifications: the diﬀerence between the IGE of a family whose
father is aﬀected by a tax reform of 1,000 dollars and a family who is not
amounts to 5.8 percentage points.
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Table 4.3: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
incomefather 0.348∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆TAX -0.005 -0.687∗∗∗ -0.954∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.20) (0.29) (0.28) (0.14)
incomefather 0.055∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
×∆TAX (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
time dummies NO NO NO YES YES NO
fixed eﬀects NO NO NO NO NO YES
controls NO NO NO NO YES NO
N 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130
Note: OLS estimations of Equation 4.4. Sample period from 1967 to 2012. The sample
is restricted to fathers and sons aged 30-40 with a time gap between generations of 25
years. Column 5 includes the following controls: ages of the father and son, the number
of children in the son’s family, and dummy variables if the son is married, if the son’s
wife is engaged in the labour market and if the son’s parents come from a poor economic
background. Only individuals that are heads of households and earn a positive labor income
are considered. Both subsamples of PSID (SRC and SEO) are considered, and probability
weights are employed. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1,
∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
Lastly, column 6 estimates Equation 4.4 including individuals (sons) fixed
eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcients of β are somewhat smaller, but the diﬀer-
ence in the intergenerational elasticities of families facing a tax reform (in the
example mentioned above) is similar, at around 4.2 percentage points.
Overall, these results suggest that fathers who face a tax cut are less likely
to pass on their income status to their sons. This is an issue of important
policy relevance, since it gives fiscal policy room to enhance intergenerational
mobility and, therefore, equality of opportunity.
What mechanism could potentially bring about these results? One could
consider a two-generation model where parents invest in the human capital of
their sons. In this framework, parents that are positively aﬀected by a fiscal
reform, are able to endow their sons with higher human capital, and thus,
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allowi them to move up in the income ladder.
This potential mechanism also relates to the literature that explores the ef-
fects of aggregate shocks on intergenerational mobility. Solon (2004) considers,
from a theoretical point of view, the eﬀect of structural changes (reforms that
aﬀect the return to human capital). Recently, Nybom and Stuhler (2014) de-
velop a model where current intergenerational mobility depends on events that
aﬀected previous generations, and empirically explore the eﬀects of a universal
school reform in Sweden to corroborate the implications from the model.
4.5 Robustness
a˘ In this section I explore the robustness of the results to diﬀerent sample
specifications.
First, Table 4.4 shows the results of estimating Equation 4.4 using diﬀerent
age specifications. Columns 1-3 consider a sample of father-son pairs aged
30 to 50. This wide election of age potentially augments the risk of life-cycle
biases as mentioned in Section 4.2, but at the same time increases the number
of observations.
The first column estimates Equation 4.4 with the new sample. The results
are very similar to those in equation in Tables 4.1 and 4.3: around a third
of the diﬀerences in income in the fathers generation are transmitted to their
sons (in the absence of tax policies). The diﬀerence in the IGE of s family with
a father that faces a tax increase of 1,000 dollars and family that doesn’t is
slightly above 4 percentage points. Column 2 adds time dummies to this spec-
ification and finds little change, with an estimated β of 0.3 (standard error of
0.02). Column 3 adopts a fixed-eﬀects specification and finds a slightly smaller
intergenerational elasticity, although the eﬀect of taxation on this parameter
146
Chapter 4. Do Tax Changes Aﬀect Intergenerational Mobility?
Table 4.4: Robustness: Diﬀerent Age Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 30-50 age 30-50 age 30-50 age 40-50 age 40-50 age 40-50
incomefather 0.340∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10)
∆TAX -0.524∗∗∗ -0.804∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -2.350∗ -4.689∗∗∗ -0.285
(0.18) (0.28) (0.11) (1.32) (1.76) (0.67)
incomefather 0.043∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.210∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.021
×∆TAX (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06)
time dummies NO YES NO NO YES NO
fixed eﬀects NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 8887 8887 8887 1776 1776 1776
Note: OLS estimations of Equation 4.4. Sample period from 1967 to 2012. The sample is
restricted to fathers and sons aged 30-40 (columns 1-3) with a time gap between genera-
tions of 25 years, and fathers and sons aged 40-50 (columns 4-6) with a time gap between
generations of 30 years. Only individuals that are heads of households and earn a positive
labor income are considered. Both subsamples of PSID (SRC and SEO) are considered, and
probability weights are employed. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue
p < 0.1, ∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
remains largely unchanged.
Columns 3-4 estimate Equation 4.4 for a sample of individuals aged 40-50.
This allows to explore the results when observing income at a latter stage in
their careers. However, the number of observations is greatly reduced, resulting
in higher standard errors. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the benchmark equation
without and with time dummies, respectively. The estimates of the IGE are
roughly similar but the importance of fiscal policy changes on this elasticity is
substantially higher. However, the coeﬃcients on TAX ti,t and its interaction
with the father’s income are associated with large standard errors (even 10
times more than other specifications), what results on these estimates being
just borderline significant (at levels of 10%). The specification with fixed eﬀects
shows point estimates more similar to the benchmark result, although some
coeﬃcients suﬀer from lack of significance.
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Table 4.5 explores the robustness of the results to other changes in the
sample selection criteria. Columns 1 to 3, report results when only considering
the core-SRC sample of the PSID (i.e. excluding the over-sampled low-income
families). Column 1 replicates the benchmark specification with the new sam-
ple and finds largely similar results: an elasticity of around 0.30 (standard error
of 0.02) and a significant eﬀect of variations in the tax code on this parameter
(the diﬀerence in IG of families aﬀected by a 1.000-dollar tax reform is around
4 percentage points). The inclusion of time dummies (column 2) does not sig-
nificantly aﬀect these conclusions. When considering fixed eﬀects (column 3),
the estimated IGE is lower (and less significant) but the eﬀect of tax policies
on this elasticity is quantitatively similar to the rest of specifications.
Lastly, columns 4-6 of Table 4.5 include not only sons but also daughters in
the intergenerational analysis. In the literature on intergenerational mobility,
daughters have been omitted from the analysis due to diﬀerences in earnings
dynamics compared to their male siblings (Solon (1992)). However Lee and
Solon (2009) measure intergenerational mobility for both father-son and father-
daughter pairs and find that the evolution of the IGE for both groups is not
substantially diﬀerent. Columns 4 and 5 shows the estimates of Equation 4.4
and a version that includes year fixed eﬀects, respectively. The results are
similar to specifications that only include sons. Point estimates of the IGE fall
in in the 0.33-0.36 range and the eﬀect of exogenous variations in taxes on the
intergenerational elasticity is very similar to the benchmark results. A speci-
fication that includes fixed eﬀects (column 6) finds a smaller IGE parameter,
while the eﬀect of the fiscal policies on this object remains qualitatively and
quantitatively close.
To sum up, measuring income at diﬀerent age intervals, constructing the
sample without the SEO (low-income) families or including both sons and
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Table 4.5: Robustness: Diﬀerent Sample Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
core core core daughters daughters daughters
incomefather 0.294∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
∆TAX -0.481∗∗∗ -0.863∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.753∗∗∗ -0.860∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.27) (0.13) (0.20) (0.29) (0.14)
incomefather 0.039∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
×∆TAX (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
time dummies NO YES NO NO YES NO
fixed eﬀects NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 3129 3129 3129 5551 5551 5551
Note: OLS estimations of Equation 4.4. Sample period from 1967 to 2012. Columns 1-3
restrict the sample to fathers and sons aged 30-40 with a time gap between generations
of 25 years from the core-SRC PSID subsample. Columns 4-6 considers fathers and both
sons and daughters aged 30-50 (columns 4-6) with a time gap between generations of 30
years. Only individuals that are heads of households and earn a positive labor income
are considered. Both subsamples of PSID (SRC and SEO) are considered, and probability
weights are employed. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ pvalue p < 0.1,
∗∗ pvalue p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ pvalue p < 0.01.
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daughters, do not significantly alter the results. All specifications find that
tax cuts that benefit the fathers, increase the degree of mobility of their sons,
as measured by the persistence of the income status between both generations.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the degree and evolution of the intergenerational
mobility in the US and how fiscal policy may have aﬀected it. I find that
fathers that experience a tax reduction as a result of a fiscal reform, are less
likely to pass on their income status to their sons.
This evidence is particularly relevant from a policy point of view. Reduc-
tions of income inequality and the enhancement of equality of opportunity
rank high in the policy makers’ priorities (see Krueger (2012)). These results
recognise that fiscal policy has a role in aﬀecting, to some extent, how much
of the income diﬀerences are transmitted across generations.
However, important pieces of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy
and intergenerational mobility still need to be understood. In Section 4.4 I
suggested that investment in human capital by families that find themselves
better oﬀ after a tax reduction could be a force at play. To explore whether
this mechanism has the potential to explain the results of this chapter, one
could analyse how the changes in taxes aﬀect the number of years of education
or the probability of attending college.
Another avenue to explore is the potential asymmetries of the eﬀect of tax-
ation on the intergenerational mobility. It is plausible that credit constrained
households do not behave in the same way as unconstrained households when
they experience a decrease in tax liabilities. To analyse this issue, a nonlinear
framework would be required.
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Lastly, there are other potential economic shocks that can aﬀect the trans-
mission of income diﬀerences across generations. For example, deep technolog-
ical changes, large devaluations, or structural reforms. These avenues are left
for future research.
151

Chapter 5
Appendices
153
Chapter 5. Appendices
A. Chapter 2: Data
The following data are obtained from the BEA’s NIPA tables (last revision on
20 December 2013)
• Output is Gross Domestic Product from Table 1.1.5 (line 1).
• Government Spending is Federal Government Consumption Expendi-
tures and Gross Investment from Table 3.9.5 (line 9).
• Total Tax Revenues are Federal Current Tax Receipts from Table 3.2 (line
2) plus Contributions for Government Social Insurance from Table 3.2
(line 11) minus Taxes on Corporate Income taxes from Federal Reserve
Banks from Table 3.2 (line 8).
• Consumption is Personal Consumption Expenditures from Table 1.1.5
(line 2).
All these variables are expressed in real terms, deflated by the GDP deflator
from Table 1.1.9 (line 1), and in per capita terms (divided by the civilian
population aged 16 or more from Francis and Ramey (2009)).
Data from other sources:
• Consumer Confidence Index. Source: Conference Board (obtained via
Thomson Reuters Datastream).
• Index of Consumer Sentiment. Source: Survey of Consumers, Thomson
Reuters/University of Michigan.
• Business Confidence Indicator (industrial confidence in the manufactur-
ing sector). Source: OECD (obtained via Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream).
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• Consumer Price Index. Source: BLS.
• Expected Inflation. Median expected price change during the next 12
months. Source: Survey of Consumers, Thomson Reuters/University of
Michigan.
• Interest Rates. 3-Month Treasury Bill (Secondary Market Rate). Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
B. Chapter 2: Robustness to Trend Specifications
In Section 2.2, both equations 2.1 and 2.5 incorporate linear and quadratic
trends, with the vector of variables xt being in levels. In this subsection we
reestimate these models, allowing for a stochastic trend by including the vector
of variables in first diﬀerences (and omitting the deterministic trends).
Figure A1 compares the responses to government spending shocks identified
with exclusion restrictions, in specifications with stochastic trends (solid lines)
and with deterministic trends (dashed lines), during periods of HU and LU. In
the latter case (LU), the only noticeable diﬀerence is the permanent eﬀect of
the shock on government spending when allowing for stochastic trends. During
times of HU, output shows a very similar pattern in both specifications during
the first two years. After that, the eﬀect of the shock starts to disappear in
the benchmark specification (dashed lines) while the eﬀect is permanent in the
stochastic trends specification.
Similar results are obtained when we consider the diﬀerent eﬀects in times
of B and R (Figure A4). Interestingly, output remains positive and significant
during times of B for the entire horizon, as opposed to what happens in the
benchmark specification (where the eﬀect of the shock lasts for about a year).
When allowing for stochastic trends, the shock has permanent eﬀects on gov-
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Figure A1: Responses during HU and LU (SVAR identification, specification
in first diﬀerences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified using
exclusion restrictions) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel (in red) shows
responses during times of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point estimates for the
alternative specification using first diﬀerences. The dashed line plots the point estimates
for the benchmark definition used in Section 2.2 with variables in levels. The 68% and 95%
confidence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
ernment spending during both R and B times. The responses of output during
times of R are very similar in both trend specifications.
The same conclusions are reached when we repeat the analysis for the
case of a government spending shock identified using narrative methods (equa-
tion 2.5). The responses during HU and LU (Figure A3) and during R and
B (Figure A2) are fairly similar regardless of the assumption of deterministic
or stochastic trends. During both R and HU, the response of output shows
permanent eﬀects when stochastic trends are considered, while the eﬀects of
the shock are temporary in the benchmark specification.
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Figure A2: Responses during R and B (SVAR identification, specification in
first diﬀerences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified using
exclusion restrictions) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red) shows responses
during times of recession. The solid line plots the point estimates for the alternative speci-
fication using first diﬀerences. The dashed line plots the point estimates for the benchmark
definition used in Section 2.2 with variables in levels. The 68% and 95% confidence bands
are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure A3: Responses during HU and LU (narrative identification, specifica-
tion in first diﬀerences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of low uncertainty. The bottom panel
(in red) shows responses during times of high uncertainty. The solid line plots the point
estimates for the alternative specification using first diﬀerences. The dashed line plots the
point estimates for the benchmark definition used in Section 2.2 with variables in levels.
The 68% and 95% confidence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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Figure A4: Responses during R and B (narrative identification, specification
in first diﬀerences)
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The top panel (in blue) shows responses to a government spending shock (identified from
narrative accounts of defence spending) during times of boom. The bottom panel (in red)
shows responses during times of recession. The solid line plots the point estimates for the
alternative specification using first diﬀerences. The dashed line plots the point estimates
for the benchmark definition used in Section 2.2 with variables in levels. The 68% and 95%
confidence bands are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
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C. Chapter 3: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A5: Evolution of the probability of transition matrix (1967-1996)
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PANEL B: Top decile
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Note: Evolution of indices of mobility at the bottom and top deciles between 1967-1968.
Panel A shows the evolution of the probability that a households leave the first decile of
income (i.e. 1− P 1,1 in Equation 4.3). Panel B shows the evolution of the probability that
a households moves down from the top decile of income (i.e. 1 − P 10,10 in Equation 4.3).
The distribution is computed using both pre-tax and post-tax income.
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Figure A6: Variation in Average Tax Rates (1967-1996)
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Note: Evolution of the average tax rates between 1967-1968.The figure displays the average
ratio of total federal income tax liabilities to adjusted gross income (AGI) for each income
decile. Tax liabilities are computed using TAXSIM and data from PSID.
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Figure A7: Variations in Average Tax Rates due to legislated tax changes
(1967-1996)
Note: Evolution between 1967 and 1996 of the instrument ∆ ¯τ t−1i,t = τ
t
i,t − τ t−1i,t (diﬀerence
between the actual average tax rate and a counterfactual average tax rate computed using
TAXSIM). Grey bars represent the narrative measure of legislated tax changes (as percentage
of nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010). These are classified as endogenous tax
changes (related to the current state of the economy, in light grey) and exogenous tax changes
(unrelated to the state of economy, in dark grey).
Table A1: Correlations between taxes (R&R, total) and mobility
τRomer
move (P) pre-tax -0.192
move (P) post-tax -0.303
move (Q) pre-tax -0.199
move (Q) post-tax -0.263
trace (P) pre-tax -0.112
trace (P) post-tax -0.169
trace (Q) pre-tax -0.173
trace (Q) pre-tax -0.216
jump (pre-tax) -0.206
jump (post-tax) -0.225
Note: Correlation between indices of mobility and the narrative measure of total legislated
tax changes (as percentage of nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010). Mobility
indices are the percentage of people changing income deciles (rows 1-2) or quintiles (rows
3-4), the normalised trace index (NTI, rows 5-6 for deciles and 7-8 for quintiles) and the
average number of income deciles passed by a household between two adjacent years. The
mobility indices are computed using both income before taxes (pre-tax) and after taxes
(post-tax).
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Figure A8: Variation in total marginal tax rates (1977-1996)
Note: Relationship between total marginal tax rates and real Adjusted Gross Income (1996
US dollars). Total marginal tax rates include the federal marginal rates on individual income,
payroll and Social Security liabilities and State marginal tax rates for each household and
year in the PSID before and after the 1986 tax reform (in red and blue, respectively).
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